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ABSTRACT
Since 2011, publicly traded corporations are required by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to self-disclose information security risks. However, because of several
undefined factors, the risk information may not accurately reflect the threats within the Internet
domain. Investors are then left ill-informed regarding this substantial risk to corporate value.
This project quantifies the disparity between reported information security risks and information
security threats finding that while reporting is becoming more accurate, corporations still only
report 66% of cybersecurity threats they face.
This project also introduces a model that delineates factors that affect the accuracy of
self-disclosed cybersecurity. The hypothesized factors are maturity, guidance, performance, and
realization. Maturity is the number of years a company has been reporting cybersecurity risks,
Guidance refers to the 2011 publication of a SEC document that instructs company’s on proper
reporting methodology. Performance is the effect on a company’s profit or loss on accurate
reporting and realization, the increase in reporting accuracy attributed to a company learning that
they do face a particular threat.
Of the four factors analyzed in the model, only two were found to be relevant in
determining cybersecurity risk reporting accuracy. Those two factors are maturity and guidance.
Performance was not found to influence reporting accuracy. While there is anecdotal evidence to
support the hypothesis that realization does improve reporting accuracy, there was not enough
data on the report to corroborate this hypothesis.
The impact of this study is twofold, first if the maturation trend continues; reporting will
improve to where they are reporting all of the risks that each corporation faces. The second
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implication is that the SEC can control the accuracy of self-disclosed reports by instructing
reporting institutions on how to prepare data for the reports they desire.
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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Investors in corporate stocks and bonds rely on publicly available financial data
collected by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to assist them with their
investment decisions. The value of a corporation is of particular importance as an investor
determines the price it is willing to pay for a share of a corporation’s stock. The value of a
corporation is also affected by the risks that it faces. Risk indicates a threat to the earning
potential of a corporation, which, in turn, affects the corporation’s value. An information
security breach is one such threat to today’s information-centric corporations.
One does not have to look very far to see how an information security breach can
affect a corporation’s value. The large international retailer, Target Corporation, was the
victim of a massive information security breach in late 2013. The records of some 100 million
customers were affected by the attack. The attack precipitated a nearly 50% drop in Target’s
earnings for the fourth quarter of 2013. Ongoing costs are still unknown as litigation against
the company due to the breach continues. Additionally, the retailer's stock lost approximately
9% of its value. Expenses associated with the breach in 2013 were more than 66 million
dollars (McGrath, 2014).
Studies have indicated that stock price devaluation precipitated by a security breach is
temporary in nature. Most stocks return to their previous level within a short amount of time,
according to Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006). This was true with the Target breach. Its
stock price returned to its pre-breach level by November 2014. However, the Acquisti el al.
study did not consider the stock price appreciation of competitors for the period. Walmart
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Corporation, one of Target’s chief competitors, realized gains of 5 - 15% above Target’s
appreciation. This disparity in stock price gains is demonstrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Stock Price Disparity

While Target has historically led Walmart in stock price appreciation, it was not until
early 2015 that Target began to close the gap and lead again. This inequality in gains for 2014
indicated that Target’s stockholders were likely deprived of a stock price appreciation of $2 6 billion for most of 2014.
As indicated, the effect of the breach to shareholders was significant but they were
unaware of the existing information security risk. The breach was the result of malware
installed on Target's point of sale system (Constantin, 2014). However, Target's 2012 SECmandated risk report does not list malware as a risk. Furthermore, while Target does talk of
the risk of a data breach it does not elaborate about the possible vector of a breach. Therefore,
the investors were not informed that malware was a potential threat. Protecting the investing
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public from this type of information deficiency is a major goal of the SEC. The Target
example shows why the SEC has heightened its concern about information security risk
issues.
The Target corporation breach is neither a new phenomenon nor an isolated incident.
In fact, incidents are becoming more frequent and are costing companies more money
(Aguilar, 2014). According to the SEC, cybersecurity incidents increased 42% from 2011 to
2012 (Aguilar, 2014). In a 2013 survey it was found that the financial cost of cybercrime had
increased 78% from 2009 to 2012 (Aguilar, 2014). This escalation has not gone unnoticed by
corporate directors. In a 2012 survey, 48% of corporate directors and 55% of corporate
counsel viewed cyber security as their top concern (Corporate Directors, 2012).
The United States' securities markets have been touted as the most financially
transparent in the world (Williams, 1999). This transparency is manifest in the accessibility of
financial information available to investors (Williams, 1999) as well as its quality, which
investors use to make informed decisions regarding the purchase and sale of investment
vehicles such as stocks and bonds. The SEC-mandated information has a wide audience as
more than 50% of US households invest directly or indirectly in corporate stocks and bonds
(Saad, 2013).
While investor intent and knowledge may differ, one constant remains: they can all
utilize the same publicly available financial information while making investment decisions.
Availability of this information ensures that no group of investors has more or better
information than the other. This symmetry of information availability and quality has been a
goal of the SEC since its inception in 1933 (Williams, 1999).
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Continuing its demand for accessible, high-quality data, in 2005 the SEC began
requesting that corporations include material risk information on their mandated 10-K reports
(SEC, 2005). In 2011, this request was altered to include information security risk data
(Ferraro, 2013). The self-disclosed cybersecurity data communicates the risk that a
corporation faces in day-to-day operation. The reported information is used by the investing
public to help them determine if they are willing to invest in an organization with specific
risks that may encumber corporate value.
As events similar to the Target breach affect more and more households, consumer
visibility of such issues has also increases. This visibility prompted a group of legislators, led
by Democratic Senator John Rockefeller, to notify the SEC that investors were not being
properly informed of cybersecurity risks (Ferraro, 2013). This communication compelled the
SEC to issue a guideline instructing corporations in how to complete the cybersecurity risk
section of the 10-K report. The SEC hoped that additional guidance would increase the
accuracy of the self-disclosed data.
However, this SEC guideline has been criticized as being vague and its effectiveness
has been repeatedly questioned (Bronstein, 2012). The SEC has countered ineffectiveness
claims with anecdotal data touting the successes of the guideline (Ferraro, 2013). While the
subjective data appears encouraging, no analytical study has validated the SEC claims. This
study is the first scientific study to examine the accuracy of cybersecurity risk reporting and
factors that affect its accuracy.
It should be noted that the SEC was invited to participate in this study but declined;
due to its policy against participating in academic research.
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1.2 Problem Definition
The following two sections will deal with the definition of the problem that this thesis
addresses. The problem statement will provide a brief statement of the problem and the
problem history statement will go into greater detail regarding the history of the issue.

1.2.1 Problem Statement
Publicly traded corporations must supply the SEC with data regarding their
information security risks. The data, which is included on the 10-K reports uploaded to the
SEC’s online system, is used by investors to help determine the fair market value of a
corporation’s stock. Unlike financial data, information security risk data is unaudited. This
lack of oversight could allow for errors and misrepresentation of risk data. If the data is
inaccurate, corporations may not be reporting all of the information security risk they face.
These inaccuracies can result in an inflated stock price and a reduced understanding of the
corporation’s true information security risks.

1.2.2 Problem History
Details regarding an organizations financial and operational performance are reported
to the SEC on the mandatory 10-K report. That information is duplicated on the Annual
Report that is sent to shareholders. Information from the 10-K report is also used to create a
prospectus, which is sent to investors and potential investors.
Information contained in the 10-K report is not limited to financial data. Organizations
are also required to include material corporate risks (Williams, 1999). The most commonly
reported risks include government, competitive, business, and capital structure (Mirakur,
2011). In October 2011 the SEC released a communication giving corporations guidance
about how to disclose information security risks on the 10-K report (Ferraro, 2013). By
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publishing the guideline, the SEC has effectively informed organizations that it considers
information security risk a material risk.
This increased concern of information security risk by the SEC is likely due to
pressure on the agency by a group of senators led by John Rockefeller who want the SEC to
be more influential in ensuring publicly traded corporations take the issue of cybersecurity
risk seriously (Bronstein, 2012).
Although requiring the disclosure of cybersecurity risks on the 10-K report may
appear to be innocuous, the implications are substantial. The SEC has effectively placed the
responsibility for information security on top management for each publicly traded entity,
insofar as it is top management that approves the data presented on the mandatory reporting.
Additionally, the corporation’s stakeholders are made aware of potential information security
risk through this mandatory reporting and thus no longer have plausible deniability.
This is an important change as information security within a corporation is often not
understood by executive management (Katz & McIntosh, 2012). Furthermore, with the
changes that the Sarbanes-Oxley act have facilitated, executive management may be
personally liable if information security risk issues are not correctly reflected on the periodic
reporting provided to the corporations stakeholders (Katz & McIntosh, 2012).
While 48% of corporate directors and 55% of corporate counsel viewed cyber security
as their top concern (Corporate Directors, 2012), only one mandatory stockholder report
addresses the issue and that is the 10-K report (for foreight companies, it is called the 20-F).
This is a critical point and bears repeating: No other communication is required to provide
information security risk information to a corporation’s shareholders. This exclusivity makes
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the information security risk information on the 10-K report essential in determining the value
of a corporation.
However, correctly reporting information security risk can be a difficult task for
corporations because the guideline provided by the SEC is considered general in nature
(Bronstein, 2012). The lack of detail leaves room for interpretation and interpretation could
lead to inaccuracies. Furthermore, a corporation needs to balance risk disclosure while
maintaining security. If it reveals a vulnerability to the public, it is at risk of inviting attacks
(Bronstein, 2012).
Publishing a system flaw exposes the same issue Microsoft faces when they release
patches for their products. When maintenance patches are released to correct a programming
flaw, hackers reverse-engineer the patch to learn how to exploit the vulnerability. This
presents a race situation between attackers taking advantage of a published vulnerability and
computer users patching their systems. In fact, according to Microsoft’s manager of security
and technology units, a system flaw has never been exploited before a patch was released
(Ward, 2004). It is only after a patch the vulnerability is exploited.
As reported in a previous study, self-disclosed risk followed two paths before the SEC
guidance. One path was to disclose risks an organization had already mitigated and the other
was to disclose risk to avoid legal prosecution (Wang, Kannan & Ulmer, 2013). With the new
SEC disclosure guidelines, organizations must disclose known information security risks
regardless of the implications to the company. However, the new guidelines come after a long
period of selectively disclosing risks to the public and investors. Therefore, it is possible that
avoidance of disclosure has continued even after disclosure guidelines have been released.
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The diagram below illustrates how corporate filters may affect the accuracy of information
security risk.

Actual Risk

Corporate Filters

Self-Disclosed Risk

Figure 2: Risk Filters

Because of corporate filters, investors should be concerned that they are not being
correctly informed about the information security risk facing a corporation. While information
security risk disclosure is mandatory, the SEC has given corporations very little instruction on
how to report them. Therefore, the accuracy of information security risk reporting could be an
issue and thus should be examined to determine if corporations are ignoring the weak SEC
guideline and reporting inaccurate data to their investors.
The financial services industry is often a target of cybercriminals and therefore bears a
large amount of information security risk (Crittenden, 2014). Not effectively responding to
risks in this industry can be very costly to an investor and, in fact to the as demonstrated by
historic banking crises throughout the years and most recently the 2007 - 2008 crisis.
Therefore, determining the accuracy of information security risk reporting by the banking
industry is important to investors, banking regulators, and the world economy.
This effect is obvious when reviewing the consequences of banking misadventures.
Recent mishaps include the increased failure of savings and loan banks in the early 1980s and
more recently the subprime lending debacle in the late 2000s. Each of these incidents had a
long term negative effect on the economy.
It is because of this high concentration of risk that the scope of this dissertation is the
banking industry. Banking is a highly regulated business sector. The regulating authorities
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include the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporations, and finally the various state regulatory commissions (Hutchinson, 1988). If the
bank’s stock is publicly traded, then the Securities and Exchange Commission is also
involved.
Although the number of agencies regulating banking institutions may appear
excessive, improper management of a financial institution can have a profound effect on
national or world economies.

1.3 Objectives & Approach
Along with determining if risk reporting is accurate, this project presents and evaluates
a model that hypothesizes the determining factors in the accuracy of information security risk
reporting. The factors that are hypothesized to affect the accuracy of risk reporting are
presented below;
1. Lack of guidance as to how to report cybersecurity risk (guidance)
2. Inexperience in determining the appropriate cybersecurity risk to the corporation
(maturity)
3. Intentionally underreporting in light of bad financial results (performance)
4. Not realizing a particular threat is present in the industry (realization)
These factors guidance, maturity, performance, and realization constitute the
independent variables in this analysis of risk reporting accuracy.
The first task in this analysis is the quantification of reported information security
risks inaccuracies. This was accomplished by taking a sample of publicly traded corporate
banks’ self-disclosed information security risk data and comparing that data with known
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threat data. The threat data was obtained inductively by reviewing the sample banks reported
information security risks reports and categorizing the risks into general threat categories. The
threat categories were then reviewed and distilled into 12 general categories. These twelve
categories were identified as industry threats.
Differences between industry threats and self-disclosed risk revealed inaccuracies in
the self-disclosure process. To determine the level of inaccuracy industry, threats were
compared to self-disclosed risks over several years. The level of disparity between reported
risks and threats fluctuated throughout the years as events related to the hypothesized factors
occurred. Analyzing this disparity allowed for quantification of the hypothesized independent
variables for the proposed model.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
This study examined reported self-disclosed cybersecurity risk qualitative data
collected by the SEC. Unlike financial data provided to the shareholders, cybersecurity risk is
unaudited (IAS Plus, 2014). The shareholder must therefore rely on the reporting corporation
to ensure that the data is correct. This study will determine if cybersecurity risk data reported
by large US banks is in step with cybersecurity threats. To that end, this literature review will
examine the following information, which is available in the knowledge base of the
information assurance domain.

•

Brief history of SEC reporting

•

Similar studies using Regulatory Risk Reporting

2.1 History of SEC reporting
The SEC has mandated that publicly traded corporations provide specific data
regarding the financial health and operations of a regulated corporation. The type of
mandatory reporting required by the SEC has changed over the 81 years that the SEC has
been in operation. However, considering the complicated nature of financial reporting,
changes have been scarce. The major changes to SEC requirements have followed significant
instability within the markets (Federal Securities Laws) as indicated in Table 1:
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Table 1: Historical Response

Market Event
Stock market crash of 1929

SEC Response
Securities Act of 1933
Exchange Act of 1934

Advisors not adequately informing customers

Investment Advisers Act of 1940

regarding risk in investment. Investment
Corporate accounting scandals (Enron, Tyco

Sarbanes – Oxley 2002

International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems
and WorldCom)
The great recession 2007 - 2008

Dodd-Frank 2010

Sluggish growth as Economy recovers from

Jumpstart our Businesses Act - 2012

the Great Recession

The events and SEC response to the events can be looked at in different ways. One
way is that SEC is working to correct the egregious activities that threaten to destabilize the
U.S. economy. The other way is that the event-and-response approach of the SEC can be
interpreted as a lack of foresight by the SEC and the elected policy makers.

2.1.1 Blue Sky Legislation
Before the SEC was created by the Securities Act of 1933, securities transactions were
governed by “Blue Sky” laws. The legislation that created the Blue Sky laws was enacted at
the state level; they are not federal law (Macey, 1991). The first state to enact the laws was
Kansas in 1911. The laws became necessary toward the end of the 19th century, the stock and
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bond markets were becoming more accessible. Previously, stock and bond investors were
wealthy, experienced business persons, or corporations. This was changing rapidly as middle
class incomes rose and inexperienced investors entered the markets (Macey, 1991).
The make-up of securities in the stock and bond markets was also changing. They
began to include more speculative offerings to the public. While experienced investors were
aware of the risks involved with speculative securities, new investors were not. There were
also offerings that were simply fraudulent, taking advantage of the influx of inexperienced
investors (Macey, 1991).
Unscrupulous securities promoters used aggressive advertising campaigns to promote
high-risk investment opportunities. The campaigns played on the greed and inexperience of
the new investors. It was within this environment that market regulation was born. The Blue
Sky laws were enacted to protect investors from fraudulent claims, not to curtail speculative
investment (Macey, 1991).
The Blue Sky laws required firms that wished to sell securities within the state where
the laws had ben enacted, to obtain a license from the bank commissioner. The entity selling
the security was also required to provide periodic reports detailing the financial condition of
the entity for which they were selling stock. Legitimate investment bankers opposed the
legislation. They opposed it not because it would eliminate fraudulent security sales but
because the same rules would apply to them. The legislation would also increase the cost of
selling securities. Also, the legitimate investment bankers were trying to distance themselves
from the fraudulent or highly speculative firms selling investments. Being forced to adhere to
the same regulation as an unestablished company may have been somewhat insulting (Macey,
1991).
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Shortly after Kansas adopted the legislation, many other states enacted the Blue Sky
laws or similar legislation. States that did not have an active investment banking market were
more likely to adopt Blue Sky legislation (Macey, 1991). This is likely due to the lobbying of
legitimate investment bankers attempting to avoid the added overhead that would follow the
legislation.
Some have argued that in the early 1900s fraudulent stock offerings were very rare. It
was the promotion and sale of highly speculative offerings that was the impetus of the Blue
Sky laws not runaway fraud and corruption (Macey, 1991). Even with the creation of the
SEC, Blue Sky legislation remains in many states. The laws are used when dealing with the
legality of the sale of securities at the state level.

2.1.2 Creation of the SEC
In the early 20th century the prevailing attitude toward business regulation was that of
laissez-faire. It was assumed that supply and demand would allow business to be selfregulating. Before the market crash of 1929 the U.S. economy was strong and growing
rapidly (Keller, 1988). The Gross National Product grew at an annual rate of 4.7% from 1922
to 1929. The unemployment rate was a very low 3.7 % (White, 1990). The stock and bond
markets were strong - likely being bolstered by novice investors. These inexperienced
investors began entering the markets as the income of the middle class rose. They also drove
up stock prices as they were deficient in evaluating the true worth of a stock (White, 1990). It
looked to policy makers that all was going well and there was no reason to impose regulation
on banks or any other industry.
Because of the inflated stock prices, businesses found that they could avoid large bank
loans by issuing equities. With corporate borrowing slowing, credit was easily available and
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inexpensive, which allowed investors to purchase stock on margin (Bhide, 1991). On October
24, 1929 known as Black Thursday and October 29 Black Friday, stock prices plummeted.
The drop in stock value initiated margin calls and panic selling. Stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange would continue to fall and lose 83% of their value. The market would
not recover to pre-crash levels until the mid-1950s (Bhide, 1991).
It was in the wake of this near financial collapse that congress enacted the Securities
Act in 1933. The Exchange Act was approved by Congress in 1934. The federal laws
mandated by the Securities Act and the Exchange Act borrowed heavily from the Blue Sky
legislation (Macey, 1991). Borrowing from previous legislation was a prudent practice as the
Blue Sky legislation had been in place for more than 20 years and had been altered throughout
the years to rectify issues that were discovered after the legislation was put into place (Macey,
1991). This provided a template in which to model the new Federal laws.
Even today we can still see similarities in the federal laws dealing with publicly traded
companies and the Blue Sky laws (Macey, 1991). Both the Blue Sky laws and the current
laws emphasize accurate reporting of the financial condition of a business before stock can be
sold. The laws also require that the financial information be reviewed and approved by an
authorized party. The authorized party has the authority to deny the applicant the ability to
sell stock for an entity that does not meet the established standards.
The new laws enacted with the creation of the SEC were an attempt to protect
investors and ensure that all investors have the same information available to them. The
following is a summary of efforts by the SEC (Bhide, 1991):
1. Publicly traded securities must register with the SEC. Registration included
information regarding the financial condition of the organization. Registrants were
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also required to provide information regarding the company's directors and major
investors
2. Registrants were also required to provide updated financial and governance
information on a quarterly and yearly basis.
3. The use of proxy voting is scrutinized to ensure that stockholders are aware of the
issues for which their vote may be used.
4. Criminal penalties were established for willfully misrepresenting information
regarding the condition of the corporation to its shareholders.
5. The SEC was also given the ability to withdraw a company's registration to sell
securities if they did not adhere to the reporting requirements.
6. Material trading actions by the corporation’s directors was made available to all
shareholders.

2.1.3 New Banking Regulation
Banks, especially small rural banks struggled during the Great Depression. Bank
failures were commonplace. With 30,000 banks in the United States, 9,000 banks failed or
suspended service (Wheelock, 1995). In 1932 Congress, with encouragement from the
Roosevelt administration, called for a banking holiday. During this holiday all banks were
shut down. Only banks that had the approval of the regulators were allowed to reopen after
the holiday (Wheelock, 1995). Much has been written regarding the effect bank failures had
on the longevity of the Great Depression but there is little consensus. However, the creation of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation that guaranteed deposits against bank failures is
credited with restoring public confidence in the 1930s banking system (Wheelock, 1995).

17
To eliminate issues that were perceived as deficiencies of the U.S. banking system, the
Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933. The focus of this legislation was to separate
commercial banks from investment and trust banking activities. The intent of this separation
was to ensure there was no conflict of interest as the banking organizations performed their
fiduciary duty for trusts (Bhide, 1991). An example of conflict of interest is when banks offer
investment products to customers, and steer their customers to a product with higher fees but
more risk. Another example is when a banker notices a large balance in a savings account
and recommends the account hold put the money into the stock market. While this may be a
good investment option for both the bank and the investor, the investment is more speculative
and the investor bears more risk.
Another conflict of interest can occur between the investment bank and the
commercial lender. The commercial bank may have a customer that has defaulted or will
default on a loan; however, the bank can prevent that default by issuing securities. The
investment bank operation sells the shares they then use those capital funds to pay the
commercial loan. This allows the bank to avoid losing money if the customer defaults. The
stockholder is then left with stock that has little or no value (Bhide, 1991).
It is unclear to what extent this type of activity occurred. However, as the issue was
debated, the public was appalled by the possibility of being deceived by their banks. They
supported the legislation for separating the banking functions. However, only banks that were
members of the Federal Reserve System were affected by the legislation. Non-member state
banks were not bound by the Glass-Steagall legislation (Hutchinson, 1988).
The idea of restricting banks activity was more about political posturing than a
practical deterrent to protect consumers (Hutchinson, 1988). The Glass-Steagall Act was
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effectively repealed by the adoption of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. Commercial
Federal Reserve member banks were once again allowed to act as a brokerage house.

2.1.4 Sarbanes -Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by congress in 2002. This legislation was enacted
as the deceptive accounting practices of several corporations’ were brought to light. The
publicized corporations that were employing deceptive accounting practices included Enron,
World Com, and Tyco (Ge & McVay, 2005).
The intent of the legislation is to ensure that executive management of a publicly
traded company is accountable for the financial information that is being provided to investors
and regulatory agencies (Ge & McVay, 2005). The legislation states that it is the
responsibility of executive management to assess the internal control mechanisms enacted by
a corporation. Information regarding internal controls is new for SEC reporting. The only
other reporting vehicle that requires assessment of internal controls is the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) implemented in 1977. Many corporations do not have dealings with
foreign countries so they are exempt from publishing the report. Therefore, for many
corporations, internal controls exposure mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley was the first time
corporations were required to review the company’s internal controls (Ge & McVay, 2005).
Substantial criminal penalties can be imposed upon a corporation’s management if it
intentionally approves a false reporting vehicle that is presented to investors or regulating
entities. The penalties can be a fine of up to $5,000,000 and a maximum of 20 years in prison
(Ge & McVay, 2005). The severity of sanctions for falsifying reports is an indicator of how
important accurately communicating a corporation’s financial condition is to the public.
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2.1.5 Banking Crisis of 2007
Although the 2007 banking crisis had little to do with the SEC’s regulation of
corporate stock, it is a fine example of how the lack of regulation can go awry. According to
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), national banks are among the most highly
regulated industries in the United States (Laws & Regulations, n.d). Even with this high
degree of reporting and evaluation, unexpected issues can arise that require foresight and
understanding of the banking industry. Without this understanding and prudence, issues such
as the banking crisis of 2007 are inevitable.
The 2007 banking crisis also serves as a reminder of how integrated banking is to the
everyday process of practicing business in an industrialized country. Not only is the
integration of banking and business limited to domestic endeavors, banking issues in the
United States can also affect businesses and economies internationally. It is for these reasons
that the SEC and other regulators keep a close eye on the U.S. banking system.
The banking crisis that occurred during the Great Depression was not the first incident
of this kind. In fact, the U.S. has experienced banking crises of varying severity in 1857,
1893, 1907, 1929, 1981, and most recently 2007 (Bordo, 2008). However, the financial crisis
of 2007 has been touted as the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. The
severity of the recession of 2007 has led many to coin the crisis as the Great Recession
(Bordo, 2008).
Although there are different theories as to the cause of the Great Recession few argue
against the subprime mortgages as a major contributor. The subprime bubble was created
during a period of historically low interest rates. The interest rates were low as result of the
Federal Reserve’s loose monetary policies between 2001 and 2004 (Bordo, 2008). Subprime
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mortgages are mortgages granted to individuals that are a higher risk for default. Another
player in the subprime mortgage market is the shadow banking system. The shadow banking
system is a collection of nonbank financial intermediaries. The creation of the shadow
banking system was made possible by the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act in 1999 (Bordo,
2008).
Shadow banking entities are operated outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve
Banking System. Also, the capital requirements of the shadow banking system are lower than
that of commercial banks. Lower capital requirements mean they carry more risk (Bordo,
2008). As interest rates began to rise in the years before the crisis, the subprime borrowers
with adjustable rate mortgages saw their payments jump. Since many of the lenders
overextended their financial position by purchasing a subprime loan, the effects of an
increased mortgage payment put many lenders in a position where they could no longer afford
their mortgage payments. This, in turn, resulted in the default of their mortgage loan.
Although the financial industry had expected a higher default rate for subprime loans,
they expected that property values would continue to rise. With the inflated property values
they would be able to recoup their losses from the sale of the foreclosed property. However,
because of the volume of defaulted loans and the poor capitalization of the banking and
shadow banking systems, property values began to decline. This caused the United States’
financial markets to be thrown into a crisis situation.
Events that exacerbated the 2007 banking crisis happened very quickly. One of the
most profound events of the crisis was the failure of the investment bank Lehman Brothers.
Other large entities were also on the verge of failure. This brought up a new term in the
financial markets - “too big to fail” (Mishkin, 2010). This concept meant that some
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organizations were so interconnected within the financial markets that their failure would be
catastrophic to the financial markets (Bordo, 2008). This prompted the United States
government to assist several large corporations in their struggle to maintain solvency. Some
of the corporations that benefited by being to interconnected were AIG, Bears Sterns, and
government sponsored enterprises such as Fanny Mae, and Freddy MAC (Bordo, 2008).
As the crisis worsened and commercial banks struggled to maintain safe levels of
capitalization, corporate lending was severely restricted (Bordo, 2008). In an attempt to
alleviate the liquidity issues that banks were facing, the U.S. Treasury began the Troubled
Asset Relief Plan (TARP). Although TARP funds were originally intended to purchase
mortgage backed securities, it was transformed into a method of injecting capital into the
banking system (Miskin, 2010). The TARP program injected 700 billion dollars into the
banking system as it purchased non-voting shares in the largest banks in the United States
(Bordo, 2008).
Not all the banks that received TARP funds were grateful for the emergency funds.
The CEO of Wells Fargo, Dick Kovacevich insisted that Wells Fargo did not need the
infusion of capital and Wells Fargo was basically forced to take the TARP funds (Belveder,
2013). Such banks found themselves accountable not only to the shareholders of the bank but
to the U.S. government and taxpayers. Entities that were provided a government “bail out”
during the financial crisis found themselves under scrutiny especially regarding sensitive
issues, such as executive compensation and perks.
Although the financial crisis of 2007 is over and the majority of the TARP funds
returned to the treasury, could this crisis have been avoided with proper regulation in place?
The financial institutions as well as government regulators were aware of the growing use of
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subprime lending in the United States. Banks were also aware of the risky nature of subprime
lending. Financial institutions that believed subprime lending was too risky to participate in
lending, were at an earnings disadvantage for many years as their completion embraced
subprime lending despite the risks. Only after the bubble had burst were the risk takers called
to account for their actions.
The subprime bubble raised the U.S. debt to more than 100% of the GDP, a level that
has not been experienced since the end of World War II (Chantrill, n.d.). As indicated in
Figure 4: Federal Debt, the U.S. taxpayer is paying dearly for the lack of oversight by our
elected officials.

Figure 3: Federal Debt

2.1.5 New regulation following banking crisis of 2007
As what appears to be the norm, the banking crisis spurred legislators to develop new
laws to prevent the incident from being repeated. The legislation passed during the 2007
banking crisis is called the Dodd Frank Act. Although the Dodd Frank Act is a long and
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detailed piece of legislation, it has only two objectives. The objectives are to address and
curtail the risks associated with the shadow banking system and minimize the risks inherent
with those entities that were considered “too big to fail” (Skeel, D. 2010).
Congresses approval of the Dodd Frank Act was assisted by a law suit levied against a
large brokerage company named Goldman Sachs. The legal proceedings alleged that
Goldman Sachs had sold mortgage-backed securities for mortgages that were expected to fail.
This information was not passed onto the purchaser of the investment thus prompting the law
suit (Skeel, D. 2010). The public was outraged by the implications of the law suit and backed
the increased regulation put forth by the Dodd Frank Act.
To accomplish the objectives of the Dodd Frank Act, regulation needed to be
expanded to include those of the shadow banking system. The act required that derivative
agreements between companies be done so one an exchange (Skeel, D. 2010). This prevents a
company from having off-balance sheet liabilities that remain unreported. The other goal of
Dodd Frank is accomplished by identifying those institutions that could cause a cascading
affect through the financial system if they failed (Skeel, D. 2010). The major collection of
these institutions were defined as “too big to fail” during the crisis of 2007. According to the
Dodd Fran Act, institutions that are “too big to fail” are subjected to increased monitoring and
required to maintain higher levels of capitalization.

2.1.6 Lessons Learned – Great Depression & 2007 Banking Crisis
If there is a lesson to be learned regarding the transparency of financial institutions it
is that regulatory bodies need to be vigilant in monitoring the financial system of the United
States. Monitoring and reporting for these critical financial players need to change as the
financial industry changes. The risks that a company faced 20 or even 5 years ago may change
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drastically in today’s market. This lack of transparency and unregulated risk in the 2007
economy is evident when the major regulators were unaware of the delicate financial
condition of Bear Stearns investment bank and other institutions (Skeel, D. 2010).
The response to risks made apparent by the Great Depression saw the creation of the
Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation and the SEC. The 2007 banking crisis saw the
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (Skeel, 2010). It is apparent from historical events that the regulation of risk in the
financial markets is reactionary and not a system that is engaged in evaluating potential risks
to protect the public from currently unseen risks.
The requirement and the encouragement by the SEC for publicly traded entities to
reveal potential cybersecurity risk is therefore an aberrant event - aberrant if we assume there
has not been a crisis; par for the course if we assume that an information security crisis has
already taken place.

2.1.7 Cybersecurity Crisis in banking
Is there a cybersecurity crisis in the banking industry? The term cybersecurity was first
used in the 1990s (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). The issues related to the security of devices
connected by a network have changed significantly from the 1990s. Today, cybersecurity
deals with issues that are extremely serious in nature. The SEC in the 2011 CF Disclosure
Guidance Topic Number 2 refers to cybersecurity as "the body of technologies, processes and
practices designed to protect networks, systems, computers, programs and data from attack,
damage or unauthorized access"
As the networking of everyday actives increases, so does the importance to secure the
activities. The security of a household banking assets is of primary importance, thus bringing
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the issue of cybersecurity in banking immediately to the forefront of concern. However, does
this indicate a crisis?
Securing banking transactions from those who attempt to steal has been a race of
technology. The use of safes and locks pitted against gunmen and explosives, secure checking
against forgery and fraud, secure accounts, passwords and protocols against hackers and
crackers. This race has been evident in the many incidents reported by financial institutions as
they attempt to stay one step ahead.
Some of the most egregious examples of data security breach include the 2008 breach
of Heartland payment systems where a SQL Injection Attack exposed the credit card details
of 134 million customers and the 2007 TJX network attack, which exposed the credit card
information of 94 million customers (Armerding, 2012). More recently is the Target
Corporation’s exposure of more than 100 million customers’ credit and debit card information
in a point of sale exploitation during a busy shopping season (Hughlett, Ramstad & Crosby,
2014).
Although none of these examples was directly due to a security deficiency in the
banking industry, all affected the financial vehicles of the industry and perhaps the industry’s
reputation. Studies have shown that corporations that experience a data security breach suffer
a short-term negative effect in stock price (Campbell et al., 2003; Acquisti et al., 2006).
While, quantifying the effect on a corporation’s reputation is a more difficult, the impact is
likely longer lasting.
Although extending banking operations to the Internet domain opens a banking
institution to more risk, they are often forced to take the risk by the simple mechanism of
competition (Munirul, Zuraini & Sailani, 2011). As more banks offer Internet banking, other
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banks are forced to enter into this market even if they are not operationally and procedurally
ready for such a venture.
Poor information security performance can dissuade customers from choosing a
specific bank for their Internet banking needs (Munirul, Zuraini & Sailani, 2011). Therefore,
applying good information security principles as a normal part of bank operations is important
to the financial wellbeing of a bank. Furthermore, capitalization requirements for a banking
entity are affected by the amount of risk the bank holds. If a bank carries a large amount of
risk, they must hold an increased amount of money in reserve to meet capitalization
requirements set forth by banking regulators (Calder & Watkins, 2010). This capital is held on
the balance sheet as a nonperforming asset, meaning the banks bank makes little or no
revenue on the balance it needs to hold in reserve. Therefore, the higher a reserve, the less
money the bank has to loan or invest.
Several organizations have brought forth information security standards that a bank
can employ to deal with information security issues. Some such standards include ISO 27002,
COBIT, FFIEC, etc. (Munirul, Zuraini & Sailani, 2011). Adopting and complying with such a
standard can help ensure that a bank is ready for the added risk of doing banking within the
Internet domain. However, each of these standards has strengths and weaknesses thus
requiring a bank to customize portions of the standard to their particular business practices
(Munirul, Zuraini & Sailani, 2011). Mixing and matching aspects of these standards can cause
confusion as a bank may not comply completely with one specific standard. The confusion
may be on the part of the bank its customers or regulating authorities. It is only through a
professional evaluation of a specific banks security framework that one can truly understand if
a bank has an adequate level of information security (Munirul, Zuraini & Sailani, 2011).
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Adding to the confusion in complying with a security standard, is the requirement to
adhere to new legislation affecting banks after the 2007 financial crisis. While large banks
generally have the resources to deal with the increase in government oversight, smaller banks
may suffer with compliance as they are forced to wade through the new requirements (Derek,
2015). This can become a difficult task as smaller banks do not necessarily have the staff or
expertise to deal with the compliance issues (Derek, 2015). Furthermore, staffing of
cybersecurity professionals may not only affect small banks. There is a lack of properly
trained cybersecurity professionals in the work force today (Evans & Reeder, 2010).
While we have not seen egregious examples of a cybersecurity crisis in the banking
industry, the elements for a crisis exist. Banks are offering products with little understanding
of how those products may increase their risk. The standards they attempt to adhere to may
not be sufficient and regulators may not catch a banks unmitigated risk due to information
security until there has been an issue. Therefore, a cybersecurity crisis in banking may be on
the horizon as banks continue to struggle with issues related to securing their data and
transactions.

2.1.8 Disclosure Topic Number 2 - Cybersecurity
The SEC began communicating its desire for more cybersecurity risk disclosure to
public corporations in October of 2011. The communiqué was issued without legislative
ruling. Because it was not followed up with legislation, corporations are not bound to this new
requirement (Ferrao, 2013). However, the SEC is proceeding as if the requirement is law.
The name of the communiqué is Disclosure Topic Number 2 - Cybersecurity (CF DG 2). The
disclosure claims authority from the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. As
previously discussed, the intent of the legislation was to ensure that public corporations reveal
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material risks to their investors. As evident by the concern of the public and corporation
executive management (Katz & McIntosh, 2012), cybersecurity has become an issue that
needs to be addressed.
Because the goal of the communication affects the private sector, there have been
questions regarding the legality of the disclosure requirement. The issues related to the
legality of Disclosure Topic Number 2 - Cybersecurity is beyond the scope of this paper.
In June of 2011 the Senior Deputy Controller of the Office of the Comptroller of
Currency (OCC) released an OCC bulletin to financial institutions. The purpose was to
remind financial institutions of a communication sent in 2005 (Long, 2011). The original
communication reminded banks of their obligation to secure on-line banking accounts. The
document also released a guideline as how banks should instigate controls within their entity.
The 2011 document informed financial institutions, primarily national banks that they would
have to conform to the guidelines presented to the banks in 2005. Furthermore, the institutions
were audited beginning in January 2012 to ensure appropriate controls are in place.
Although the OCCs risk control guidance document is vague and directed toward
online accounts, the message was much the same as the CF DG 2. Banks need to ensure that
controls are in place to prevent cybersecurity issues. The appropriate section of the CF DG 2
document has been attached as Appendix E.
Furthermore, Senator John Rockefeller raised the exposure of the communiqué' by
expressing his approval of the measure to then SEC chairperson, Mary Shapiro. The
communication between the senator and the SEC occurred in April 2013. Senator Rockefeller
also requested that the effort be given more attention insofar as corporations need to take
cybersecurity risks seriously (Young, 2013). Lack of attention to this issue could put the
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investor at a disadvantage by not being informed of material risks of the corporation in which
it has invested. The senator previously expressed his concerns to the SEC in May of 2011.The
October communication was likely a response to the senators written concern.
Rockefeller's efforts in 2011 and 2013 were not those of a single senator’s crusade as
several Democratic senators added their names to the letter sent to the SEC (Young, 2013). It
is possible that the letter was a precursor to political posturing for adding SEC regulation to
the failed Critical Infrastructure Act. The SEC chairperson promised she would review the
disclosure requirements (Ferrao, 2013). The June 2011 communication from the OCC is also
likely a response to the growing concern expressed by Congress and the public in general.
Responding to Rockefeller's 2013 request for greater exposure of cybersecurity risk
disclosure by the SEC, Chairperson Shapiro responded citing the sufficiency of the October
2011 communication (Ferrao, 2013). Shapiro demonstrated the supposed adequacy of the
communication by revealing fifty case studies of companies that had already been informed of
their deficiency in disclosure (Ferrao, 2013). Two of the case studies have been critically
examined by the Albany Law Review (see Appendix F).
The Albany law review has determined that the October 11 communication is not an
effective disclosure vehicle nor does it have the authority to enforce accurate disclosure. The
opinion was established as the cases were reviewed for disclosure actions taken after the SEC
expressed concern regarding disclosure of known issues (Ferrao, 2013). Indifferent to the
opinion of the Albany Law Review, as of January 2014, the guideline has not been usurped by
a more extensive policy.

30

2.1.9 SEC Guidance Instructions
The SEC’s October 11 guidance document will be called CF DG 2. This is short for
Corporate Finance Disclosure Guidance Topic Number 2. CF DG 2 appears in regular SEC
communications and is maintained on the SECs website. The document is fairly short and
outlines the following points;
1. Digital communication has been ever increasing.
2. Cybersecurity issues have increased.
3. The guidance has been prepared to ensure that publicly traded corporations are in
compliance with SEC disclosure laws stated by the SEC Acts in 1933 and 1944.
4. Material risks need to be reported on the 10-Q and 10-K reports.
5. There are no other federal laws that require the collection and publication of
cybersecurity risks.
6. The company must determine the materiality of a risk of incident and report that
incident. The company should also include information regarding the costs and issues
related to a cybersecurity.
7. Material events need to be reported on report 8-K. Section 8 refers to other material
events. This may logically include cybersecurity events (Young, 2013).
8. Disclosure of a cybersecurity issue that may have been undetected for a length of time.
9. Disclosure should be specifically related to the risks determined by the company. The
company should avoid "Boiler Plate" rhetoric as they discuss cybersecurity risk.
10. The language of the 10-Qs.55 and 10-K reports should be straight forward and easy to
comprehend.
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11. Not only should cybersecurity issues be disclosed, the immediate and ongoing losses
should be disclosed.
12. Legal proceedings resulting from cybersecurity incidents need to be disclosed.
13. The company should have controls in place to deal with cybersecurity issue disclosure.

2.1.10 Preparation of 10-K & 10-Q
The instructions for completing the required disclosure are included with the 10-Q and
10-K instructions (10-Q is a quarterly report). From this point on, this paper will discuss the
10-K report. These instructions are available on the SECs main website. The risk section for
the 10-K report is Item 1A, Risk Factors. The instructions refer the filer to risk factors
described in item 503(c) of regulation S-K 229.503 (c). The document has been included in
Appendix G.
As evident in Appendix G, the preparation instructions for risk disclosure are
extremely general in nature. There is no defined methodology or even a systemic approach to
the mechanics of completing the report. In fact, the CF DG 2 document, while vague, has
more concrete instruction than the formal instructions for the risk section of the 10-K report.
Because the instructions do not provide a formal format, the resulting reports are unique to
each entity. Therefore, it can be very difficult for an investor, or a researcher, to extract
important data from the report. This can be of concern because this is the only place where a
publicly traded corporation is asked to disclose information security risk.

2.1.11 Preparation 8-K
Although, not included in the CF DG 2, normal SEC disclosure reporting includes the
preparation of form 8-K. This form is for reporting material events during the forms indicated
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period. Section 8 of the form has a section for “other events”. The instructions require that
corporation include events that would be of interest to the stockholders. It has been argued
that cybersecurity breaches should be included as a material event in this section of the selfdisclosed events (Young, 2013).
In 2004 the SEC changed the requirements for form 8-K to include a wider variety of
events. It also expedited the reporting of the event to 4 days. Some had speculated that this
increased interest in form 8-K would reduce the amount and quality of meaningful
information presented on the 10-K and 10-Qs.55 reports. Lerman and Livnat investigated this
concern by reviewing the 8-K, 10-K and 10-Qs reports for over a half million filings. Their
findings indicated that information on the 10-K and 10-Qs.55 reports was not reduced in
volume or value (Lerman & Livnat, 2009).

2.2 Regulatory Risk Reporting
With the scarcity of like projects, this study will examine closely related ventures with
the hopes of drawing a parallel with other studies on self-disclosed risk. Although the SEC
requested cybersecurity risk data in 2011, they previously required corporations to disclose
other types of material risks on their mandatory reports (Helbok & Wagner, 2006). The most
commonly reported risks are related to capital, competition, personnel, government, and
economic environment (Mirakur, 2011). Scientific studies have been performed on some of
this risk data and will provide the parallel needed for the literature review.
The first such study was researching operational risk (OR) reporting. Although the
SEC did not require OR reporting in 1998, researchers found that the disclosure of OR
between 1998 and 2005 was significant and was showing signs of maturity (Helbok &
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Wagner, 2006). Value at Risk (VAR) is an indicator of the risk in a bank's portfolio. In 1998,
the SEC mandated that banks begin reporting (VAR). By 2001, the VAR indicator was added
to nearly all regulated bank's 10-K reports (Jorion, 2002).
Independent analysis of VAR in 2002 indicated that the self-reported VAR is accurate
and useful to the shareholder. Furthermore, it appears that the reliability of this index is
maturing as banks learn more about the preparation of VAR (Jorion, 2002). In a later study,
qualitative risk data was collected from corporations between 2005 and 2008. Researchers
analyzed the data and determined that the risks presented on the 10-K reports were accurate
(Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu & Steele, 2011).
Researchers also discovered that shareholders were reacting to the reported risk data
(Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu & Steele, 2011). The shareholder’s reaction resulted in the
increased value of a corporation when risk factors were low (stock prices rose). The converse
was also true. When risk factors were high, stock prices fell (Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu &
Steele, 2011). This indicates that shareholders do react to risks presented in the 10-K report.
In a 2009 Dutch study, researchers analyzed the prospectus information sent to
shareholders to determine if they were being properly informed of corporate risk. The risk
portion of a prospectus is not materially different from the 10-K report. In this study they
found that the risk statements were an adequate indicator of future risks (Deumes, 2008).
Other studies have utilized self-disclosed cybersecurity risk as an indicator of a
potential data breach (Wang, Kannan & Ulmer, 2013) or perception of risk (Campbell, Chen,
Dhaliwal, Lu & Steele, 2011) but none compared the data to the reported threats.
Furthermore, previous studies have not been conducted using data collected after the 2011
SEC guideline was published. One of the first studies that focused on the “1A Risks” section
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of the report was a 2011 study by Campbell et al. This study classified all risks grouping
information security risks into general categories and once again discovering that investors
were using their information in the valuation of a corporations stock.
Several studies have used the 10-K reports to analyze the tone of words used in the
reports (Li, 2010, Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat & Segal, 2009). The studies concluded that
the readability and tone of the reports foreshadow the future profits of a corporation. A 2015
study by Loughran & McDonald cast some doubt on such studies. They claimed that the
classification of words as positive or negative was done incorrectly.
While many studies mentioned above focused on data mining techniques to identify
words or groups of words associated with risks from the 10-K, some used full sentences
(Linsley, Shrives & Crumpton, 2006). Using a full sentence was thought preferable, but
coding the data was more time consuming. Although the statements of risk made in
mandatory reporting may be difficult to read, they are not done so to conceal risk (Lindsey &
Lawrence, 2005). It was also found that reporting risks may actually benefit a corporation.
Studies have discussed the benefit of proper risk disclosure (Hope, Hu & Lu, 2014).
Disclosure can help shield the corporation from potential litigation (Dixon & Odoner, 2012).
In fact, corporations with high litigation potential report more risks when reporting is
voluntary. When risk reporting is required, the disparity in the level of risk reporting
decreases (Nelson & Prichard, 2014).
Studying corporations’ reaction to 10-K comment letters sent from the SEC,
researchers found that corporations do increase their disclosure when individually contacted
about a deficiency (Zahn, 2013). This is consistent with the statements made by the SEC
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regarding anecdotal data discussed previously. This is also the premise behind the Realization
variable hypothesized in this thesis.
As presented in this literature review, studies have been successfully carried out using
quantitative and qualitative data from the 10-K report. While there are similarities between
this study and other research projects, this study remains unique as it examines information
security risk. Also, it will add to the body of knowledge because no other study of this type
has been carried out after the SEC request for cybersecurity risk data and it’s subsequently
published guideline. The study is also unique insofar as the study’s sample population will
consist exclusively of large U.S. banks, and risks were compared to recognized threats.
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RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Overview
The primary data collection methodology used for this thesis was qualitative data
analysis, insofar as it derived data from textual reports. The textual data was then transformed
into quantitative data by coding the data into generalized classifications. This quantitative data
will then be used for all data analysis.
The study used the final, year-end 10-K report of a sample of the 30 largest
commercial banks in the United States for the years 2007 to 2014. The 10-K data was
transformed into quantitative data for analysis. While qualitative data projects (such as case
studies) are difficult to analyze (Yin, 2003) the use of controls helped assure data validity.
One of the controls utilized was a qualitative codebook. The codebook helped ensure that the
qualitative data was coded in a consistent manner (Creswell & Clark, 2007).
Once the data from the corporations was coded, the information was categorized.
After categorization, each bank's risk data was compared to the threat information collected
inductively from the 10-K reports. When there was a match, this was recorded. When all the
banks were processed, the number that indicated a match was summed by year and then by
entity. The summation was then be divided by the corresponding summation of threats for
each particular year.
For instance, if ABC Bank had six risks that matched a corresponding threat, there
would be a 6 in the match indicator column. If the threat data indicated 15 threat categories,
ABC Bank would then have a matching total of .4 (∑ risk / threat). Therefore, an entity that
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has identified all of the risk for each threat category had a matching percentage (MP) of 1.
Conversely, no matches resulted in a MP of 0.
Transforming qualitative 10-K report data into quantitative data is not unique to this
study. This is the same technique used in a study to examine the accuracy of self-disclosed
material risks (Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu & Steele, 2011) and in a study that sought to
use the described risk factors as a predictor of cybersecurity incidents (Wang, Kannan &
Ulmer, 2013).
The study also used year-end earnings per share data to determine how a profit or loss
could affect the accuracy of cyber security risk reporting. This data was collected from
standard industry reports for each of the sample corporations. The profits were recorded as a 1
and the losses as a 0.
It was also necessary to capture whether each corporation had experienced an event
that resulted in an exploit of a cybersecurity risk. Any significant issues or changes within a
corporation that occur between 10-K reporting periods need to be filed on an 8-K report. This
report was used to collect cybersecurity incident information. The 8-K reports for the sample
were obtained from the SEC’s EDGAR system. The reports were then manually evaluated to
determine if the corporation experienced an exploitation of a cybersecurity risk. The factors
were recorded as a summation of events for that corporation for the desired year.
Multiple coders were used to help ensure validity. Several 10-K reports were picked at
random and given to a second coder. After the reports were coded by both coders, any
differences were noted and the necessary changes to the code book were made.
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3.2 Project Model
The objective of this research project is to scientifically determine if self-disclosed
risk reporting on the SEC mandated 10-K report is accurate. The study also attempts to
ascertain factors that may affect the accuracy of the report. This study presents a model
illustrating the action of the independent variables on the dependent variable, reporting
accuracy.
The goal of the project model was to ascertain if, and to what degree, the described
factors affect the reporting accuracy of cybersecurity risk. The proposed model for the
interaction is presented in Figure 3.

Maturity

Guidance

Performance

H2

Realization

H3
H4

H1

Reporting
Accuracy

Figure 4: Research Model

Each association to the reporting accuracy construct represents a hypothesized relation
between the two constructs. The solid lines between the constructs indicate a relationship that
is not bound by the timing of an event. The dotted lines indicate that the variable is isolated by
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the temporal nature of an event, for instance; the publishing of the guidance document in
2011. The hypotheses are presented below;
•

H1:

Guidance contributes to reporting accuracy

•

H2:

Maturity does occur and contributes to reporting accuracy

•

H3:

Profitable corporations have higher reporting accuracy

•

H4:

A cybersecurity incident will increase reporting accuracy

3.3 Theoretical Foundation
This thesis has identified four cause-and-effect relationships that may have a bearing
on the accuracy of self-disclosed cybersecurity risks. No single theoretical foundation
encompasses each relationship. Therefore, the theoretical foundation for each of the
relationships is identified separately.
Lack of guidance
Cause:

Guidance

Effect:

Increased accuracy in cybersecurity reporting

Theory:

general deterrence theory

The theoretical basis for this relationship is the General Deterrence Theory (GDT)
which states that the perceived likelihood of being caught and the perceived severity of
punishment are key decision factors in considering committing an infraction (Gibbs, 1975). In
this model, the infraction is intentionally underreporting cybersecurity risk. The punishment
would be some legal action initiated by the SEC or stockholders.
Although the SEC asked corporations to include material risks in 2005, corporations
were left to determine which risks were material risks. As stated previously, when the
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cybersecurity risk reporting guideline was published in 2011 it, in effect, informed
corporations that cybersecurity risks are material risks. Therefore, incorrectly reporting
cybersecurity risk violates an SEC directive. This study treats the SEC request for accurate
risk reporting as a law and not doing so an infraction of that law. Treatment of the SEC
guideline as law makes the General Deterrence Theory an appropriate basis for the study.
If the GDT applies to this situation, there should be an in reporting accuracy after the
2011 guideline publication. This increase in accuracy would be due to a corporations attempt
to comply with the SEC's request. Determining the effect guidance had on reporting accuracy,
the number of reported risks was compared from year to year. If guidance was an active
phenomenon, there would be an increase in the number of risks being reported after the
guidance document of 2011 was published.This construct was analyzed using simple variance
analysis and regression analysis using a dummy variable to indicate the year that the guidance
document was published.
Gaining Experience
Cause:

Maturity

Effect:

Increased accuracy in cybersecurity reporting

Theory:

learning curve

Maturity, in the context of this study referrers to an increase in efficiency and quality
of a process over time (Yelle, 1979). The mechanism at work with the Maturity variable is the
phenomena of the learning curve. Although the learning curve is predominantly used in
manufacturing, it has also been used to analyze the efficiency and quality of management
reporting (Yelle, 1979).
If the learning curve phenomenon is present in cybersecurity self-disclosed risk
reporting, analysis will show that reporting becomes more accurate as corporations gain
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experience. In this study, this phenomenon will be evident if corporate self-disclosure of
cybersecurity risk begins to match the actual threat. Because Maturity is a temporal
measurement, convergence should increase over time.
Similar to guidance, maturity was analyzed by examining the variance of reported
risks from year-to-year. If a maturity effect was occurring, the year-to-year variances would
steadily increase. Furthermore, to extricate the maturation effect from other possible
variables, regression analysis was performed regressing the number of years of reporting
against the number of risks being reported.

Intentional Underreporting
Cause:

Performance

Effect:

Decreased accuracy in cybersecurity reporting

Theory:

agency theory

The SEC receives its authority from the 1933 securities and 1934 exchange acts
passed by Congress. The acts are general in nature but stress the importance of transparency
between the corporations and shareholders. The intent was to provide investors with accurate
information regarding their investment in a corporation.
According to the agency theory, the relationship between stockholders and corporate
management is one of agent and principal. Stockholders, the principal, delegate the task of
running a corporation to the corporate management, the agent. Issues can occur if the goals of
the principal and agents are dissimilar (Eisenhardt, 1989). This schism in goals may incent
corporate management to underreport unfavorable news in the interests of corporate
management.
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Therefore, it is in the interests of corporate management to understate corporate
cybersecurity risk when they have already reported poor financial performance. In a 2009
study, Kothari et al. (2009) observed that corporate managers delay sharing bad news to
investors. While other studies have found no evidence that risk disclosure is related to
financial performance (Linsley, Shrives & Crumpton, 2006), the Kothari et al. (2009) used
general disclosure statements on which to base their conclusion. This study concentrated on
information security risk statements to determine if the agency theory phenomenon is
occurring.
In this study, the effect of performance on the accuracy of risk reporting was
determined by regressing the profitability of a corporation, calculated using earnings per share
data against the number of risks being reported on the 10-K report.

Awareness of risk
Cause:

Realization

Effect:

Increased accuracy in cybersecurity reporting

Theory:

agency theory / general deterrent theory

Although corporations should be aware of the cybersecurity risks present within their
corporate domain, it is possible they underreport them because they are unaware of them.
They may believe that a threat does not apply to them or that they have no exposure. They
also may wish to avoid detailing the risk to their stockholders for self-serving purposes as
described by agency theory. However, if an undisclosed risk is exploited and exposed to the
public, the details of the exploit will need to be revealed.
After an incident, it is possible a corporation will attempt to limit its liability by being
vigilant in correctly reporting all risks (Skinner, 1994). General Deterrent Theory would also
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apply as a corporation attempts to comply with regulations before they face sanctions.
Therefore, if a risk is exposed it is possible that the accuracy of cybersecurity risk reporting
will increase.
It was the intent of this study to determine the realization effect on reporting accuracy
by performing variance and regression analysis. In this analysis, reporting accuracy would be
regressed against a dummy variable indicating if a cybersecurity event occurred. The data
indicating that a cybersecurity event occurred would be taken from each of the sample
populations’ 8-K report. However, it was found that there were no cybersecurity incidents
reported on the 8-K reports for the sample population. This made analyzing the realization
effect impossible.

3.4 Sample Selection
The intent of the study was to analyze the 10-K reports from the 30 largest publicly
traded U.S. banking corporations. Because there are many ways to determine the size of a
bank, it was decided that total deposits (publicly available from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)) would be used. Deposits were chosen because of the availability of
deposit information and its general understandability. To be included in the study, the banking
corporations needed to be U.S. corporations subject to mandatory reporting requirements as
stated by the SEC. To generate the list of sample banks, the bank name and total deposit
information were downloaded from the FDIC. The list was then sorted by total deposit and
the top 30 entities selected. The list of sample entities is presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Sample Entities

Entity Name

Ticker

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Bank of America, National Association
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
Citibank, National Association
U.S. Bank National Association
PNC Bank, National Association
Capital One, National Association
State Street Bank and Trust Company
Branch Banking and Trust Company
SunTrust Bank
Fifth Third Bank
Regions Bank
Charles Schwab Bank
Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association
The Northern Trust Company
Union Bank, National Association
KeyBank National Association
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company
Goldman Sachs Bank USA
Comerica Bank
Ally Bank
The Huntington National Bank
E*TRADE Bank
First Niagara Bank, National Association
GE Capital Retail Bank
City National Bank
New York Community Bank
Silicon Valley Bank
Hudson City Savings Bank
Synovus Bank

JPM
BAC
WFC
C
USB
PNC
COF
STT
BBT
STI
FITB
RF
SCHW
MS
NTRS
UBSH
KEY
MTB
GS
CMA
ALLY
HBAN
ETFC
FNFG
GE
CYN
NYCB
SIVB
HCBK
SNV

3.5 Risk Categories
Because the risks on a corporation’s 10-K report are typically presented in a general
manner, it was necessary to combine many risks into condensed categories. The generality of
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the categories matched the generality of the risks on the 10-K reports. Here is an example of a
corporate risk statement:

“While the Company has policies and procedures designed to prevent or limit the effect of ,
interruption or of its information systems, there can be no assurances that any such failures,
interruptions or security breaches will not occur; or if they do occur, that they will be
adequately addressed.”

As presented, the statement does not specifically name any information security risks
that could be recognized by an informed reader. However, by analyzing the statement and
making inferences about its meaning, it can be inferred that the corporation is stating they are
disclosing risks about computer maintenance and system hacking or cracking. This inductive
conclusion was reached by examining the terms “failure” and “security breach” in the
statement.
This inductive categorization process was completed by reading each statement and
then referring to a catalog of previously classified statements. Use of a catalog reduced the
possibility of miscoding a statement (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Although time consuming, the
process was not be possible using data mining or other methods, that is searching searching
for keywords or strings of key words.
After reviewing each of the 30 organizations 10-K reports for the 2007 – 2014 periods,
the risk statements were reduced to the categories presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: Risk Categories

Risk Categories
Configuration / Architecture
Denial of Service
Hacking / Cracking activity
Identity Theft
Insider
Maintenance
Malware
Mobile issues
Phishing / Email attacks
Social Engineering
Third Party
Virus – Computer

Risk statements regarding environmental, natural disasters, terrorism, pandemic, or
war were not included in this study. While they may be risks to the corporation, they are not
specific enough to categorize as an actual threat. Furthermore, the inclusion of terrorism, war,
etc. on the 10-K report has been seen as a reaction to events and not as an actual risk to a
corporation (Robbins & Rothenberg, 2005). If the study were to include natural disaster risk,
the risk data would be skewed by organizations whose geographical locations put them at
high risk for natural disasters, for example hurricanes or earthquakes.
The derived risks categories - with the exclusion of the afore-mentioned risks do, at
face value, match the threats facing an organization doing business in the current online
environment. However, it is still beneficial to use multiple sources to provide validity to the
derived data (Yin, 2003). To this end, an attempted to find a list of information security
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threats that were generalized enough to match the risk categories was conducted. Most threat
category data found in the domain literature was either too specific or too general to match the
risk categories created out of the study.
It was difficult to find studies that had categorized information security risks. Most
studies such as Bao (2013), grouped information security risk into procedural categories such
as operational disruption. For this reason, it was not possible to validate the risk categories
using convergent validity techniques.

3.6 Data Collection
The majority of the 10-K data was obtained from the SEC’s Edgar system. Some
organizations, such as Wells Fargo and U. S Bank, do not include information security risks
on their 10-K report. They refer to their annual report as the source for this information.
Referring to the annual report for risk disclosure is allowed by the SEC. It was therefore
necessary to download the annual report from each of these entities’ websites.
To ensure that the correct data was downloaded from the Edgar system, the forms file
was obtained. This file contains a list of uploaded documents for each quarter. Figure 5: SEC
Forms file, is a sample from this file.

Figure 5: SEC Forms File

48
Because the data is reported with a three month delay, the first quarter data contains
the year-end data for the entity. The file for years 2007 – 2014 was obtained. This file was
then truncated to include only the 10-K forms for the entities of interest. Because the file
included the full path for the desired reports, it was possible to write selective FTP download
scripts to obtain both the 10-K and 8-K data. An example of the FTP script used for the
download process is presented in Figure 6: Selective FTP Script.

Figure 6: Selective FTP Script

Because the download included many files, it was necessary to schedule downloads
during weekend evenings. Scheduling downloads during off hours was suggested by the
EDGAR administrators as a way to prevent a system slowdown for other users of the EDGAR
system.
The downloaded files ranged in size from 1 to more than 130 megabytes in size and
occupied nearly 14 GB on the retrieval disk. The larger files contained hundreds of pages of
information. While the files were stored and downloaded as text files, they were formatted as
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html. Because of the size, it was not possible to review the data in a text editor. The files had
to be converted to html so they could be viewed in a web browser.
Viewing the files in a web browser made it possible to take advantage of the
hyperlinks within the document. This facilitated navigation to section “Item 1A Risk Factors”
easily. Figure 7: Sample 10-K Hyperlinks, is a sample of the presentation of the 10-K repots
index feature with hyperlinks. Not all 10-K reports had hyperlinks. For reports without
hyperlinks, it was necessary to perform a textual search for the correct section of the report.

Figure 7: Sample 10-K Hyperlinks

Yearly earnings per share data were utilized to determine if the entity had a profit or
loss for the reporting year. This information was downloaded for each entity from Morning
Star Financial. Morning Star is a company that provides freely available financial information
to the public. However, as stated previously, this information is public and could have come
from a variety of sources.
After the data was downloaded it was matched to the correct entity and entered into a
database created for collection of the study data.
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3.7 Data Transformation
A total of 240 10-K reports were used for the study. That number represents 30
entities for a period of 8 years. Each report had the possibility of populating 12 risk categories
and therefore 2,880 possible entries.
Each 10-K report was examined to determine which information security risks the
organization was disclosing. According to the guideline published by the SEC, information
security risk should be identified in section “1A Risks” of the 10-K report (SEC, 2014). Thus,
this section was the focus of the examination. The report was read much the same way an
investor would read any financial report. The risk section was reviewed for headings that
could contain risk reporting information. Attention was then focused on those sections for
analysis.
Information security risk statements were often intermixed with general operational
risk statements. Operational risk statements mentioning fraud, unauthorized transactions, or
process breakdown were not included in this study. It was important to separate the general
operational statements from those about information security. This was done by thoroughly
reading the statements to ensure that the reports were discussing their computer systems.
Risks related to manual processes or operational controls, such as checks and balances, were
not included in this study.
As each section was analyzed, information security risk data was collected into a
database using a data entry application developed for the task. Figure 8: Data Entry
Application is a screen capture of the data entry application’s input form.
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Figure 8: Data Entry Application

Along with facilitating data input, the data entry application also provided data
integrity functions. Those functions included choosing risk categories from a dropdown box
to prevent the possibility of mistyping a category name. Furthermore, the data input into the
main data collection table was created using a composite primary index key. The primary
index key is comprised of the reported year and the risk category. Because this is a primary
key, there is no possibility of duplicate entries within the main collection table.
Another integrity task the data input application facilitates is a display of the entity
name. During data collection, it was possible to match the entity name on the database to the
10-K report being coded. The application also includes the reporting date, file name, and path
where the data for the particular organization is located.
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After the data was collected, the risk incident categories for each of entities by year
were summed as illustrated in Table 4: Summation of Risk Categories presented below. (See
Appendix A for full list).

Table 4: Summation Risk Categories

Bank of America
Citibank
Wells Fargo

2007
5
4
7

2008
5
2
6

2009
6
2
5

2010
7
3
6

The final summation is the quantitative data used in the data analysis section of this
thesis. Because statements of self-disclosed risks were categorized, it was also possible to
analyze categorized data. Table 5:, is a sample of a report that utilizes categorized data (see
Appendix A for full listing).

Table 5: Summation of Risk

Configuration
DOS
Hack

2007
12
1
7

2008
14
1
10

%Var
17%
0%
43%

3.8 Validity
As with any scientific study, validity must be considered. Furthermore, studies that
incorporate qualitative data often have issues not seen in a strictly quantitative study (Yin,
2003). It was therefore important to establish guidelines that ensure proper controls. This
study employed a variety of methods to guarantee rigor regarding validity.
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The first validity methodology used was complete documentation of the coding and
categorization criteria of the qualitative data. This was accomplished by creating and
maintaining a coding catalog. The catalog criteria are stored in a database and all ambiguous
coding decisions were made by referring to this catalog. This disciplined coding approach
provided for transparency and replication of the coding process.
Replication allowed multiple coders to validate the coding process. Operationally, this
was accomplished by providing a random selection of qualitative data to a second coder. The
second coder utilized the coding catalog to code the random sample. Differences between the
two coder’s data were noted and discussed between coders occurred before a final coding
occurred. The catalog was then adjusted to remove the ambiguity that caused the discrepancy.
Another validity process that was employed was the review of a random sample of 10K reports. To this end, a random sample of 10-K were reexamined to determine if the sample
was coded correctly. 4% of the reports were reanalyzed representing 120 entry points. The
analysis resulted in an error rate of less than 1%. Any discrepancies were reviewed and
adjustments were made to the sample data.
The random reports chosen for reanalysis were selected by numbering each report and
using a random number function to select the number that corresponded to the report. This
methodology ensured that the samples were chosen at random.
Additional validity efforts, such as determining convergent and discriminate validity,
were accomplished by comparing the constructs and their proceduralization with other
studies. Although this is a unique study, other projects have used similar constructs for their
research endeavors. Two such studies are those conducted by Wang, Kannan & Ulmer, 2009
and Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, Steele, 2011. Both studies used risks data from the 10-K
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report. The studies then categorized the data using techniques specific to their study. The
Wang study focused on the context of the statement and the Campbell study focused on the
type of risk.
Both studies were able to illustrate predictive validity. Using the 10-K data, the Wang
study was able to predict the occurrences of a breach announcement by a study entity. The
Campbell study was able to associate risk disclosure with an actual occurrence associated
with the disclosed risk.

3.8.1 Coding Catalog
As mentioned previously, a coding catalog was created to provide consistency for
ambiguous statements. While some of the risk statements were straightforward, that is those,
indicating disclosure of the risk of a virus, malware, or denial of service attack; other
statements were less definitive, thus making coding more difficult. The coding catalog created
specified a keyword or phrase with a corresponding category. An excerpt from the coding
catalog is presented in Table 6: (see Appendix C).

Table 6: Coding Catalog Sample

10-K expression
Threat Name
Account takeovers
Identity theft
Breach
Hack
Cyber Attacks
Hack
Degradation of service DOS
e-Fraud
Identity theft
Electrical Outage
Not included. This is a business continuation issue
Employee Tampering Insider
Employee tampering Insider
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To understand the construction of a coding catalog it is necessary to define a code. Put
simply, in qualitative data analysis a code is a word or phrase that summarizes an idea or
salient point involved in the analysis (Saldana, 2008). Because the interest of this study is
cybersecurity sometimes otherwise referred to as information security, the salient statements
were all related to an entity’s computer system. This allowed statements not related to the
computer system to be ignored.
While some coding can be completed for the purposes of discovery (Saldana, 2008)
this study did not utilize a heuristic coding methodology. Also, categories are often
determined after an initial coding of the data has been completed (Saldana, 2008). However,
because this study has a specific scope, statements were immediately coded into categories.
Although the coding categories were determined inductively, they were primarily
determined by explicit declaration of a specific risk. This therefore reduced the amount of
interpretation required to determine coding categories.
Some of the unambiguous statements examined were easy to categorize. For instance,
the statement “attacks could degrade the availability of our online banking system” was coded
as Denial of Service. Other statements such as “Spam attack” were more difficult to
categorize. The statement “Spam attack” could be viewed as a denial of service attack or an email attack such as phishing. The decision in this case was to categorize this statement as the
risk of an e-mail based attack. This was determined to be the most likely intent of the report
writer. This model of most likely intent was used for categorizing all of the ambiguous
statements encountered.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Dataset
The goal of the data analysis was to determine if, and to what degree, the described
factors affect the reporting accuracy of cybersecurity risks. It is hypothesized that each of the
factors acts independently on reporting accuracy. Therefore, the study consisted of four
independent variables representing these factors: guidance, maturity, performance, and
realization. The dependent variable was the accuracy of cybersecurity risk reporting.
The independent variables were longitudinal, with values collected for each year from
2007 to 2014. Because there was a reasonable amount of data and no missing data, panel data
analysis was an appropriate technique for this-time series study (Torres-Reyna, 2010).
Analyzing panel data enables treating each time period as a separate variable. This allowed
for the analysis of guidance and maturity constructs as a function of the variance between
time frames. It was also possible to use a dummy variable that represents the number of years
of maturity and guidance.
The dependent variable, reporting accuracy, was the percentage of risks matched to
threats for each period. It was then possible using regression analysis to determine the
correlation coefficient of the independent variables performance and realization as they are
regressed against the dependent variable reporting accuracy.
Examining the variances between periods provided data about how maturity affects
reporting accuracy. This is the same technique that was used to determine the effect of the
guidance factor. The guidance factor does not manifest until 2011. Therefore, the variance of
reporting accuracy between 2011 and 2014 is the effect of guidance on the matching
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percentage. The coefficients determined for each factor were added to the model. Analysis of
the completed model fulfills the goals of this project.
When dealing with longitudinal data, it was difficult to understand its full meaning
without being aware of the events that occurred during the data collection timeframe. The
following timeline is presented as a convenient point of reference.
2012 - 2014
Relization

2007 - 2014
Performance

2007
Financial Crisis

2008
Troubled Asset
Relief Plan

2008

2009

2010
Dodd Frank Act

2010

2011

2013
2012
2011
Target
Bank
SEC
Guideline DOS Attacks Breach

2012

2013

2014

2007

2014
2011 - 2014
Guidance

2007 - 2010
Maturity

Figure 9: Data Time Line

As indicated by the timeline, there were many events occurring throughout the period
of study. Some of the events were likely to affect the rate at which entities report information
security risks. By using a longitudinal data analysis technique such as panel data analysis, it is
possible to utilize some of the events as variables in our analysis, for instance, guidance. In
late 2011, the SEC published a guidance document instructing entities how to report
information security risks. Therefore, an effect of the guidance in the 2011 - 2014 data would
be observed.
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To incorporate the effect of guidance in a regression model, it was necessary to create
a dummy variable named “guide.” This variable was valued at zero for all years from 2007
through 2010. The years after the guidance was published have the “guide” variable valued at
1. The “guide” variable allowed the process to identify those values that occurred before and
after the published SEC guidance document of 2011.
This same dummy variable methodology was also used for the Maturity variable.
Maturity, being a variable theorized by the phenomena of the learning curve, occurs
continuously. The occurrence of Maturity is evident by report writers gaining experience in
report creation from year to year. By using a dummy variable name “mat_1,” it was possible
to indicate the maturity of each data point to the regression model. For instance, in year 2007,
the “mat_1” value was 1 in 2007 the value was 2. The “mat_1” variable was incremented
through each year of the study. The column named “cik” was the unique identifier for each of
the subject entities. The threat column was the summation of the threat for that entity by year.
The “match” was the percentage of risks matched to threats for that entity in that year. The
“eps” column indicates the actual earnings per share number where the “eps_ind” was a 1 for
a profit and 0 for a loss.
An illustration of the resulting data set used for analysis is presented in Table 7:.
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Table 7: Dataset Sample

year

cik
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

threat
18349
19617
28412
35527
36104
36270
40545
40729
49196

5
4
0
4
3
0
0
2
1

match
eps_ind eps
41.67
1
33.33
1
0.00
1
33.33
1
25.00
1
0.00
1
0.00
1
16.67
0
8.33
0

mat_1
11.2
4.38
4.43
1.99
2.43
5.95
2.17
0
0.25

guide
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

This dataset is considered to be in a long format, indicating there is an individual row
for each interval. The corresponding wide format would see the time interval as a column of
data. Furthermore, the dataset is considered highly balanced, indicating there are no missing
values.

4.2 Data Analysis
While some of the simple data analysis was conducted using Microsoft Excel, the tool
chosen to perform the advanced statistical analysis was a commercially available package
named Stata created by Stata Corporation. Stata was chosen primarily for its ability to easily
analyze panel data. Stata also has a large user community and a support staff to help with
technical or analytical issues.
While several regression analysis techniques were considered, panel data analysis with
fixed effect appeared to be the most appropriate methodology. This method was chosen
because there is longitudinal data for each entity and the focus is on variables across time.
Panel data analysis works effectively for this type of analysis because it controls for time
invariant variables (Baltagi, 2008).
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To further justify the decision to use fixed effects analysis, the data was subject to the
Hausman test, which determines if the unique error is correlated with the regressor (Greene,
2009). If the error is correlated, the random / single-level mixed method of analysis may be
more appropriate form of analysis than the fixed method. The results of the Hausman test are
included in Table 8:.

Table 8 : Hausman Test Output

The results of the Hausman test indicated that there was little difference in the
coefficients from the fixed and random analysis methods. Furthermore, we have a high degree
of significance as the value of chi-squared is 0.9942, indicating that the fixed effects model is
appropriate.
The dataset was also been tested for autocorrelation using the Woodridge test. The
output of that test is below in Table 9:. Since the outcome of the test is insignificant, we
assume that we are not seeing an autocorrelation effect.
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Table 9: Woodridge Autocorrelation

The data was also tested for heterogeneity as shown in Figure 10, indicating that there
were considerable differences in the mean of the dependent variable, thus resulting in an
upward progression. This result is further supported by the data analysis.

Figure 10: Heterogeneity Variable by Year

Finally, the data was tested for heteroskedasticity. While the test is included on Table
10, the nature of the independent variables means it has very little meaning. The reason for
this lack of meaning is the independent variables, which are considered dummy variables and
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simply mark either the timing of an event or the profit or loss during a period. For this same
reason, scatter graphs are of little use as they show only the value of the dummy variable. In
the interest of completeness, the scatter diagrams are included in Appendix D.

Table 10: Data Heteroskedasticity

4.2.1 Reporting Accuracy Analysis
Corporations determine cybersecurity risks by evaluating likely attacks against
resource vulnerabilities that could result in an unfavorable event (Stoneburner, Goguen &
Feringa, 2002). Generally, all threats within a specific domain should elicit the recognition of
a risk as illustrated in Figure 11.

Risk

Domain Threat

Figure 11: Matched Threat Illustration
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If a risk is not disclosed on the 10-K report, it may indicate that an entity is unaware of
the threat, or does not want to disclose the threat. An unmatched threat is illustrated in Figure
12.

Domain Threat

Risk

Figure 12: Unmatched Threat Illustration

In this study, the threats within our domain of study have been assigned a category
name. Therefore, an unmatched threat represents a risk that an entity has not disclosed to its
stockholders. Examining the percentage of self-disclosed risks to threats gives us an idea of
how accurate an entity self-disclosed risk reporting is on its 10-K reports. For this reason, the
study examined the matching percentage of each entity.
After coding and categorization of the 10-K reports was completed, a matching
percentage was calculated for each entity. The matching percentage was calculated as follows:

∑ Reported Risks
∑ All Categories

The percentages for each entity were then averaged and sorted by year. The results are
presented below in Table 11.
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Table 11: Cumulative Matching Percentage

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Average
Median
StdDev

20.56 23.61 29.17 32.78 46.11 56.11 62.22 66.67
20.83 25.00 33.33 37.50 50.00 58.33 62.50 66.67
16.77 17.09 18.10 17.73 17.18 19.59 16.49 15.81

As presented in the table, in 2007 the average matching percentages of the 30 entities
was 20.56%. Therefore, of the 12 risk categories included in this study, only 2 or 3 were
reported. This percentage increased progressively through the years until we come to 2014,
where an average 66.67% of risks were self-disclosed. Furthermore, the standard deviation
has decreased from 16.77 to 15.81 indicating there is less variance in each entity’s matching
percentage.
Analysis of the matching percentage indicates that entities were reporting more
information security risks than previous years. Also, more companies were reporting an
increased amount of risk. While this is indeed encouraging, the numbers also indicate that
companies were still underreporting information security risks by 33% or approximately four
risk categories.
Although the number of reported risks was increasing, there is still enough evidence to
assert that, as of 2014, the self-disclosed information risk reporting of large U.S. banks is
inaccurate. This inaccuracy began as early as 2007 and continued to a lessening degree
through all 8 years of the study. The analysis of the data further demonstrated that none of the
study subject entity’s reported 100% of the risk categories on their 10-K reports. The entities
highest percentages of reported risks in 2014 were 92% and 83%. The complete list of entities
and accuracy percentages are in Appendix A.
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4.2.2 Maturity Analysis
The 10-K report data being analyzed for this study spans eight years, from 2007
through 2014. During this period it is likely that those creating the 10-K reports became more
proficient in their creation. This proficiency would be noticeable in more accurately reporting
the information security risks that an entity faces. This phenomenon of increased efficiency
and accuracy is based on the learning curve theory.
The simplest analytical methodology to detect the learning curve phenomenon within
the study sample is to calculate the variance of cumulative matching percentage from year to
year. The calculation for this variance is as follows:

∑ Risks Year 2 - ∑ Risks Year 1
∑ Risks Year 1

Table 12: Cumulative Matching Variance, represents the variance for each year of the study
data.

Table 12: Cumulative Matching Variance

2007 2008 % Var 2009 % Var 2010 % Var 2011 % Var 2012 % Var 2013 % Var 2014 % Var
Total Matching

74

85

15%

105

24%

118

12%

166

41% 202

22% 224

11% 240

7%

As demonstrated by the data, each year there is a positive increase in variance thus
representing an increase in the number of cumulative risks being reported. Between 2007 and
2008 we see an increase in reported risks of 15%. The final year of data, 2014 realizes an
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increase of 7% over the previous year. Figure 13, helps to illustrate the progression of
increasing disclosure.

Figure 13: Total Matching by Year

While it may be tempting to attribute all of this variance to the learning curve, that
would be inaccurate. Other factors play a role in the increasing number of risks being
reported. Therefore, in an attempt to extricate the learning curve (maturity) effect from other
factors, we enlist regression analysis techniques.
Performing a regression analysis on the panel data using the matching percentage as
the dependent variable and guidance, maturity, and performance as independent variables
resulted in the output presented in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Regression Analysis

The fixed effects panel data regression calculation for the regression analysis is
presented below:

Yit = β1X1it + β1X2it + β1X3it + αi + uit
When
Y = Matching Percentage
X1 = Performance
X2 = Guidance
X3 = Maturity
I = Entity
t = Time
β1 = Coefficient for independent variable
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αi

=

Unknown intercept for each subject entity

uit

=

Error

As illustrated by the output, all of observations were included for the model and
grouped by entity. Also, it was determine that the model is valid by checking that all of the
coefficients are different from zero as “Prob > F” is less than .05. Other pertinent information
regarding maturity is summarized in Table 13.

Table 13: Maturity Regression Values

Indicator
Coef

Description
Coefficients of the regressor indicate the

Value
5.50

increase in “matching” when maturity is
increased by one year.
t

t-Value tests to determine if coefficients are

8.59

different from zero. For 95% accuracy this
value should be > 2.045
P>|t|

Two tailed P-Value test determining if

0.000

coefficient is different from zero. For 95%
accuracy this is less than .05.

As the table above indicates, Maturity was a major determinant of the number of risks
reported by an entity. In fact, for every year of maturity, the number of risks reported
increases by more than 5 percentage points. Additionally, by examining the “t” and “P>t”
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indicators we can determine that maturity has a significant influence on the number of risks
being reported by our test entities.

4.2.3 Performance Analysis
Another variable that was hypothesized to affect the number of risks reported by each
entity is the profitability of an entity. It was hypothesized that when a company is profitable it
is more inclined to disclose bad news such as an increase in information security risk. This
variable was added to the regression analysis mode and the pertinent results are in Table 14.

Table 14: Performance Regression Values

Indicator
Coef

Description
Coefficients of the regressor indicate the

Value
0.66

increase in “matching” when performance is
one .
t

t-Value tests to determine if coefficients are

0.27

different from zero. For 95% accuracy this
value should be > 2.045
P>|t|

Two tailed P-Value test determining if

0.79

coefficient is different from zero. For 95%
accuracy this is less than .05.

The performance variable tells an entirely different story from the maturity variable. In
fact, the results from the “t” and “P>|t|” indicate that the performance variable has no effect
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on the dependent variable, therefore indicating that an entity’s performance does not affect the
number of risks being reported. To determine if the insignificance of performance is due to
intercorrelation, a correlation table of the independent variables was run. See Table 15:
Correlation Table.

Table 15: Correlation Table

As indicated above, the marker that identifies performance, “eps_ind” is not highly
negatively correlated with either of the other independent variables. This fact, combined with
the low significance of the variable, indicates that performance is not significant in
determining the number of reported risk. Therefore for the performance variable we must
accept the null hypothesis that performance does not affect risk reporting.
This result is not unprecedented. A 2006 study examined Canadian and UK banks in
regard to risk disclosure and profitability. Although the study examined all reported risks and
the banks were from the UK and Canada, they too concluded that there was no correlation
between profitability and risk disclosure (Linsley, Shrives & Crumpton, 2006).

4.2.4 Guidance Analysis
As mentioned previously in this thesis, yielding to Congressional pressure the SEC
published a guideline for reporting information security risk. This guideline was released to
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the public in October of 2011. Because the sample entities did not file their mandatory
reporting for the 2011 until the first quarter of 2012, the effect of the SEC guidance would be
apparent in 2011 reporting. Therefore, this effect will be seen from 2011 until the last year of
this study, 2014.
Referring to Figure 15, there is a sharp increase in reported information security risk in
the 2011 10-K reports. The increase is 41% over what was reported in 2010. This increase is
the largest single year increase that we see throughout this study. The positive variance is
nearly 100% higher than the next highest increase occurring in 2009.

SEC Guidance Published

Figure 15: Total Matching with Guidance

At face value, it certainly appears that Guidance has a significant effect on the amount
of information security risk reported. However, the increase in 2011 also includes the other
independent variables under study. Therefore, we can refer to the regression analysis numbers
to confirm the significance of the Guidance variable. The regression information for guidance
is presented in Table 16.
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Table 16: Guidance Regression Values

Indicator
Coef

Description
Coefficients of the regressor indicate the

Value
9.11

increase in “matching” after the Guidance
document was published
t

t-Value tests to determine if coefficients are

3.06

different from zero. For 95% accuracy this
value should be > 2.045
P>|t|

Two-tailed P-Value test determining if

0.003

coefficient is different from zero. For 95%
accuracy this is less than .05.

Regression analysis confirms the significance of guidance with a P-Value well below
.05 and a t-Value of 3.06. The issuance of the guidance document therefore resulted in a
9.11% increase in the number of information security risks being reported.

4.2.5 Realization Analysis
The intent of this study was to collect data about information security events from
each of the subject entity 8-K reports. As indicated previously, the 8-K report is used to
inform investors regarding material events that occurred between postings of the quarterly
management reports. After review of the 8-K reports for the sample population, we found no
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information security risk incidents reported. However, according to Pelroth (2012), there were
several subject entities that did have information security incidents as reported by the media.
Six banks had experienced sustained denial of service attacks during the week of
September 24, 2012. These banks were part of this study sample population: Bank of
America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, U.S Bank, Wells Fargo, and PNC Bank. Comparing
the reported denial-of-service risk reported between 2011 and 2012 we see the following
results in Table 17: Selected Entity 2011, 2012 DOS.

Table 17: Selected Entity 2011, 2012 DOS

Name
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Bank of America, National Association
Citibank, National Association
PNC Bank, National Association
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
U.S. Bank National Association

Ticker
JPM
BAC
C
PNC
WFC
USB

DOS DOS
2011 2012
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

As Table 17, indicates, prior to the publicized DOS attacks, only two of the entities
reported a risk of DOS. However, after the attacks occurred, all six of the entities reported
DOS as a risk on their 10-K reports.
Further indication that the Realization phenomena may be occurring comes in the
wake of the Target data breach of 2013. In 2013, Target announced a data breach that exposed
millions of customers’ financial data. The vector of the breach was malware on Target’s point
of sale systems (Constantin, 2014). If Realization is occurring, we would expect an increase in
the reporting of malware risk in 2013. Table 18: Malware Reported after Target Breach,
indicates the number of entities that reported malware risk from 2011 – 2014.
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Table 18: Malware Reported after Target Breach

Malware

2011
8

2012
11

2013
16

2014
18

The results indicate there was a 45% increase in the reporting of malware after this
announcement. This was followed by only a 12% increase the following year.
While the result of this analysis gives some credence to the effect of Realization, it is
only anecdotal evidence. Because security incident information was not available on the 8-K
reports, it would be necessary to thoroughly search all media to do a successful scientific
study. Because this was beyond the scope of this study, validation of the realization variable
was abandoned.

4.3 Completed Model
The model presented in Figure: 16
independent variables to the dependent variable.

indicate the correlation strength of the
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Maturity

Guidance

Performance

Realization

.66

5.50

NA

9.11
Reporting
Accuracy

Figure 16: Updated Model

The insignificant independent variables are removed and the final model is presented
in Figure 17. This indicates that both maturity and guidance have a significant effect on
reporting accuracy of the 10-K report. Thus the null hypothesis is rejected for both Hypothesis
1 and 2.

Guidance

Maturity

H1

H2

Reporting
Accuracy

Figure 17: Final Model
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CONCLUSIONS
While the term accuracy is subjective, this study found that in 2014 the study entities
did not report 33% of the risks found within their domain of business. The number of reported
risks steadily climbed throughout the study period. This increase in risk reporting is an
encouraging sign. However, it is up to the bank regulating authorities to determine if
including 66% of risks makes the report accurate.
Two factors were found to have an effect on the reporting accuracy of information
security risk. The first factor was maturity. As entities gained experience in reporting risks,
the accuracy of their reporting increased. The other factor was guidance. When the SEC
published a guidance document telling companies what to report and how to report it,
accuracy increased.
The effect of maturity on reporting accuracy was not unexpected. As presented earlier
in this thesis, the feasibility of applying learning curve theory to management reporting has
been established. However, increasing the accuracy of risk reporting not only required
organizations to learn how to report but also required them to learn more about their
corporation. By learning more about the risk they face, corporations will be in a better
position to mitigate those risks.
The increase in reporting accuracy due to guidance is an important finding. It shows
how a simple instruction can increase the accuracy of risk reporting. While this study focused
on information security risk, guidance could be used for other risks as well. Also, the SEC
published the guideline without implementing additional legislation. If it were necessary for
the SEC to seek new legislation, the objective would have been substantially delayed or even
dismissed by a vote of congress.
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The study also demonstrated that entities’ profitability had no effect on the accuracy of
information security risk reporting. This result was previously observed in studies with
different types of risk. It is therefore not surprising that accuracy information security risk
reporting is not dependent on entities’ profitability.
Although the study presented anecdotal data to show that reporting of a specific risk
increased with the realization of that risk, it could not be studied scientifically. The scope of
the study would have had to change considerably to facilitate a scientific study of this
hypothesized phenomenon.

5.1 Future Work
In many ways this study can be viewed as a proof of concept. The study reviewed selfdisclosed information security risk from the SEC-mandated 10-K report and got meaningful
results. However, the study was limited to large U.S. banks. Additional studies could use a
random sample of all publicly traded corporations regulated by the SEC to provide a
generalizable result.
Publicly traded corporations should be reporting incidents such as security breaches on
their 8-K reports, but they are not doing so. This lack of reporting prevented scientifically
determining whether realization of a threat increased the likelihood of reporting that threat’s
corresponding risk. Another study could be undertaken that would circumvent this lack of 8-K
reporting by using other means, such as news reports, to determine which threats were
becoming known as a result of a publicized breach.
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Because of the general nature of the risk statements made on the 10-K report, risks
needed to grouped into broad categories. It is likely that risks being reported on the 10-K
report will become more specific as the process matures and entities become aware of the
number of information security risks they face. When there is more specificity in reporting,
this type of study could be conducted with more specific categories.
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2007 2008 % Var 2009 % Var 2010 % Var 2011 % Var 2012 % Var 2013 % Var 2014 % Var
Configuration
12 14 17% 17 21% 16 -6% 20 25% 22 10% 20 -9% 22 10%
DOS
1
1 0%
1 0%
3 200%
7 133% 21 200% 22 5% 22 0%
Hack
7 10 43% 13 30% 17 31% 27 59% 29 7% 29 0% 29 0%
Identity Theft
1
2 100%
2 0%
5 150%
4 -20% 6 50% 8 33% 8 0%
Insider
10
9 -10% 11 22% 12 9% 15 25% 15 0% 19 27% 22 16%
Maintenance
18 21 17% 25 19% 25 0% 26 4% 25 -4% 28 12% 28 0%
Malware
1
2 100%
2 0%
3 50%
8 167% 11 38% 16 45% 18 13%
Mobile
0
0 0%
0 0%
0 0% 10 1000% 17 70% 20 18% 20 0%
Phishing
0
0 0%
1 100%
1 0%
3 200% 6 100% 8 33% 12 50%
SocialEngineer
0
0 0%
1 100%
1 0%
6 500% 7 17% 7 0% 8 14%
ThirdParty
14 17 21% 19 12% 20 5% 25 25% 26 4% 28 8% 30 7%
Virus
10
9 -10% 13 44% 15 15% 15 0% 17 13% 19 12% 21 11%
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DATA ANALYSIS

Reported risk by type with variance:
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Risks by Entity

Name
Synovus Bank
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Comerica Bank
Fifth Third Bank
U.S. Bank National Association
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company
GE Capital Retail Bank
Ally Bank
The Huntington National Bank
Bank of America, National Association
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
The Northern Trust Company
KeyBank National Association
Branch Banking and Trust Company
State Street Bank and Trust Company
City National Bank
Charles Schwab Bank
PNC Bank, National Association
Silicon Valley Bank
SunTrust Bank
Citibank, National Association
Union Bank, National Association
Goldman Sachs Bank USA
Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association
New York Community Bank
Hudson City Savings Bank
Capital One, National Association
E*TRADE Bank
First Niagara Bank, National Association
Regions Bank

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
5
5
5
0
7
6
8
8
4
4
4
5
9 10 10 10
0
2
2
2
5
5
6
6
4
5
6
6
6
7
7
8
3
3
1
4
4 10
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
4
0
0
0
1
3
3
5
4
2
2
2
4
4
5
9
9
1
1
1
1
4
5
5
7
2
2
2
6
8
9
9 10
0
0
6
5
6
7
7
6
4
4
4
5
7
8
7
9
3
3
3
3
8 10
9
9
5
6
7
6
7
8 11 11
3
3
4
5
6
9
9
9
2
2
2
2
4
5
4
4
5
5
5
6
6 11 11 10
0
0
0
2
5
7
8
8
3
4
6
6
7
8
9 10
5
5
5
7
5
6
6
8
5
6
6
7
8
8 10 10
1
2
2
2
4
4
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
8
7
8
2
2
2
4
5
6
8 10
0
3
3
3
6
6
6
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
8
4
5
4
4
8
7
8
9
5
5
5
5
6
6
9
9
0
0
6
5
6
7
7
7
0
0
6
6
6
8
6
7
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Percentage Matching Risks by Entity

Name
Synovus Bank
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
Comerica Bank
Fifth Third Bank
U.S. Bank National Association
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company
GE Capital Retail Bank
Ally Bank
The Huntington National Bank
Bank of America, National Association
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
The Northern Trust Company
KeyBank National Association
Branch Banking and Trust Company
State Street Bank and Trust Company
City National Bank
Charles Schwab Bank
PNC Bank, National Association
Silicon Valley Bank
SunTrust Bank
Citibank, National Association
Union Bank, National Association
Goldman Sachs Bank USA
Morgan Stanley Bank, National Association
New York Community Bank
Hudson City Savings Bank
Capital One, National Association
E*TRADE Bank
First Niagara Bank, National Association
Regions Bank

2007
41.67
33.33
0.00
33.33
25.00
0.00
0.00
16.67
8.33
16.67
0.00
33.33
25.00
41.67
25.00
16.67
41.67
0.00
25.00
41.67
41.67
8.33
50.00
16.67
0.00
0.00
33.33
41.67
0.00
0.00

2008
41.67
33.33
16.67
41.67
25.00
0.00
0.00
16.67
8.33
16.67
0.00
33.33
25.00
50.00
25.00
16.67
41.67
0.00
33.33
41.67
50.00
16.67
50.00
16.67
25.00
0.00
41.67
41.67
0.00
0.00

2009
41.67
33.33
16.67
50.00
8.33
0.00
0.00
16.67
8.33
16.67
50.00
33.33
25.00
58.33
33.33
16.67
41.67
0.00
50.00
41.67
50.00
16.67
50.00
16.67
25.00
0.00
33.33
41.67
50.00
50.00

2010
0.00
41.67
16.67
50.00
33.33
0.00
8.33
33.33
8.33
50.00
41.67
41.67
25.00
50.00
41.67
16.67
50.00
16.67
50.00
58.33
58.33
16.67
50.00
33.33
25.00
0.00
33.33
41.67
41.67
50.00

2011
58.33
75.00
41.67
50.00
33.33
0.00
25.00
33.33
33.33
66.67
50.00
58.33
66.67
58.33
50.00
33.33
50.00
41.67
58.33
41.67
66.67
33.33
50.00
41.67
50.00
0.00
66.67
50.00
50.00
50.00

2012
50.00
83.33
41.67
58.33
83.33
25.00
25.00
41.67
41.67
75.00
58.33
66.67
83.33
66.67
75.00
41.67
91.67
58.33
66.67
50.00
66.67
33.33
66.67
50.00
50.00
0.00
58.33
50.00
58.33
66.67

2013
66.67
83.33
50.00
58.33
75.00
25.00
41.67
75.00
41.67
75.00
58.33
58.33
75.00
91.67
75.00
33.33
91.67
66.67
75.00
50.00
83.33
41.67
58.33
66.67
50.00
50.00
66.67
75.00
58.33
50.00

2014
66.67
83.33
50.00
66.67
75.00
33.33
33.33
75.00
58.33
83.33
50.00
75.00
75.00
91.67
75.00
33.33
83.33
66.67
83.33
66.67
83.33
41.67
66.67
83.33
66.67
66.67
75.00
75.00
58.33
58.33
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APPENDIX B: GRAPHICAL OVERVIEW
Graphical view of proposed project

10-K Cybersecurity
Risk Reports

HP Threat Report
8-K Material
Incident Reports

Yearly 2007 - 2013
100 Largest US Banks by
Deposts

Symantec Threat
Report

SANS Data

10-K Financial
Performance
Reports

Categorize Data with
Codebook

Categorize Data with Codebook

NO

Determine
Convergence

YES
Quantitative
Data to
Database

Convergence will be
tested until it is
deemed impossible.
At that point data will
be evaluated
separately

Quantitative
Data to
Database

Data matched
Risk|Threat by year

Report: Guidance

Report: Maturity

Report:
Performance

Report: Realization

89

APPENDIX C: CODING CATALOG
10-K expression
Account takeovers
Breach
Cyber Attacks
Degradation of service
e-Fraud
Electrical Outage
Employee Tampering
Employee tampering
Faulty or failed equipment
improper implementation of
systems
Improper use of system
improve system failure
Inadequate Systems
Induce frequently information
Intercepted Data
Internal Security Breach
Interruption

Threat Name
Identity theft
Hack
Hack
DOS
Identity theft
Not included. This is a business continuation issue
Insider
Insider
Maintenance
Configuration

Hack
Configuration
Configuration
Social Engineering
Hack
Insider
Not included. Just stating an interruption in system functions is
not specific enough to include.
Malfeasance
Insider
Malfunction
Maintenance
Natural Disaster
Not included. Natural disasters are a business continuation issue
Outsourced Vendors
Third-party
Overloaded System
Configuration
Programming Error
Configuration
Shortcoming of System
Configuration
Spam Attack
Phishing
System flaws
Configuration
System Flaws
Configuration
Systems inability to act correctly in Configuration
normal operation.
Targeted Attacks
Hack
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10-K expression
Technical Flaws
Terrorism

Threat Name

Configuration
Not included. The term is to generic. If they descirbe a security
threat that terrorism causes then it will be included
Transactin volume increase failed Configuration
system
unable to implement protective
Configuration
measures
Unauthorized Access to System
Hack
Unavailable online banking system DOS
Unlawful Tampering
Hack
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APPENDIX D: SCATTER DIAGRAMS
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APPENDIX E: CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE NO. 2
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2
Cybersecurity
Date: October 13, 2011
Summary: This guidance provides the Division of Corporation Finance's views
regarding disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents.
Supplementary Information: The statements in this CF Disclosure Guidance
represent the views of the Division of Corporation Finance. This guidance is not a rule,
regulation, or statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further, the
Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its content.

Introduction
For a number of years, registrants have migrated toward increasing dependence
on digital technologies to conduct their operations. As this dependence has increased, the
risks to registrants associated with cybersecurity1 have also increased, resulting in more
frequent and severe cyber incidents. Recently, there has been increased focus by
registrants and members of the legal and accounting professions on how these risks and
their related impact on the operations of a registrant should be described within the
framework of the disclosure obligations imposed by the federal securities laws. As a
result, we determined that it would be beneficial to provide guidance that assists
registrants in assessing what, if any, disclosures should be provided about cybersecurity
matters in light of each registrant’s specific facts and circumstances.
We prepared this guidance to be consistent with the relevant disclosure
considerations that arise in connection with any business risk. We are mindful of potential
concerns that detailed disclosures could compromise cybersecurity efforts -- for example,
by providing a “roadmap” for those who seek to infiltrate a registrant’s network security - and we emphasize that disclosures of that nature are not required under the federal
securities laws.
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In general, cyber incidents can result from deliberate attacks or unintentional
events. We have observed an increased level of attention focused on cyber attacks that
include, but are not limited to, gaining unauthorized access to digital systems for
purposes of misappropriating assets or sensitive information, corrupting data, or causing
operational disruption. Cyber attacks may also be carried out in a manner that does not
require gaining unauthorized access, such as by causing denial-of-service attacks on
websites. Cyber attacks may be carried out by third parties or insiders using techniques
that range from highly sophisticated efforts to electronically circumvent network security
or overwhelm websites to more traditional intelligence gathering and social engineering
aimed at obtaining information necessary to gain access.
The objectives of cyber attacks vary widely and may include theft of financial
assets, intellectual property, or other sensitive information belonging to registrants, their
customers, or other business partners. Cyber attacks may also be directed at disrupting
the operations of registrants or their business partners. Registrants that fall victim to
successful cyber attacks may incur substantial costs and suffer other negative
consequences, which may include, but are not limited to:
•

•
•
•
•

Remediation costs that may include liability for stolen assets or information and
repairing system damage that may have been caused. Remediation costs may
also include incentives offered to customers or other business partners in an effort
to maintain the business relationships after an attack;
Increased cybersecurity protection costs that may include organizational changes,
deploying additional personnel and protection technologies, training employees,
and engaging third party experts and consultants;
Lost revenues resulting from unauthorized use of proprietary information or the
failure to retain or attract customers following an attack;
Litigation; and
Reputational damage adversely affecting customer or investor confidence.

Disclosure by Public Companies Regarding Cybersecurity Risks and Cyber Incidents
The federal securities laws, in part, are designed to elicit disclosure of timely,
comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that a reasonable
investor would consider important to an investment decision.2 Although no existing
disclosure requirement explicitly refers to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, a
number of disclosure requirements may impose an obligation on registrants to disclose
such risks and incidents. In addition, material information regarding cybersecurity risks
and cyber incidents is required to be disclosed when necessary in order to make other
required disclosures, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading.3 Therefore, as with other operational and financial risks, registrants should
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review, on an ongoing basis, the adequacy of their disclosure relating to cybersecurity
risks and cyber incidents.
The following sections provide an overview of specific disclosure obligations that
may require a discussion of cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents.

Risk Factors
Registrants should disclose the risk of cyber incidents if these issues are among
the most significant factors that make an investment in the company speculative or
risky.4 In determining whether risk factor disclosure is required, we expect registrants to
evaluate their cybersecurity risks and take into account all available relevant information,
including prior cyber incidents and the severity and frequency of those incidents. As part
of this evaluation, registrants should consider the probability of cyber incidents occurring
and the quantitative and qualitative magnitude of those risks, including the potential
costs and other consequences resulting from misappropriation of assets or sensitive
information, corruption of data or operational disruption. In evaluating whether risk
factor disclosure should be provided, registrants should also consider the adequacy of
preventative actions taken to reduce cybersecurity risks in the context of the industry in
which they operate and risks to that security, including threatened attacks of which they
are aware.
Consistent with the Regulation S-K Item 503(c) requirements for risk factor
disclosures generally, cybersecurity risk disclosure provided must adequately describe
the nature of the material risks and specify how each risk affects the registrant.
Registrants should not present risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering and
should avoid generic risk factor disclosure.5 Depending on the registrant’s particular facts
and circumstances, and to the extent material, appropriate disclosures may include:
•
•
•
•
•

Discussion of aspects of the registrant’s business or operations that give rise to
material cybersecurity risks and the potential costs and consequences;
To the extent the registrant outsources functions that have material cybersecurity
risks, description of those functions and how the registrant addresses those risks;
Description of cyber incidents experienced by the registrant that are individually,
or in the aggregate, material, including a description of the costs and other
consequences;
Risks related to cyber incidents that may remain undetected for an extended
period; and
Description of relevant insurance coverage.
A registrant may need to disclose known or threatened cyber incidents to place

the discussion of cybersecurity risks in context. For example, if a registrant experienced a
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material cyber attack in which malware was embedded in its systems and customer data
was compromised, it likely would not be sufficient for the registrant to disclose that there
is a risk that such an attack may occur. Instead, as part of a broader discussion of
malware or other similar attacks that pose a particular risk, the registrant may need to
discuss the occurrence of the specific attack and its known and potential costs and other
consequences.
While registrants should provide disclosure tailored to their particular
circumstances and avoid generic “boilerplate” disclosure, we reiterate that the federal
securities laws do not require disclosure that itself would compromise a registrant’s
cybersecurity. Instead, registrants should provide sufficient disclosure to allow investors
to appreciate the nature of the risks faced by the particular registrant in a manner that
would not have that consequence.

Endnotes
Cybersecurity is the body of technologies, processes and practices designed to

1

protect networks, systems, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or
unauthorized access. Whatis?com available
athttp://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/cybersecurity.html. See also MerriamWebster.com available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity.
2

The information in this disclosure guidance is intended to assist registrants in

preparing disclosure required in registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933
and periodic reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In order to maintain the
accuracy and completeness of information in effective shelf registration statements,
registrants may also need to consider whether it is necessary to file reports on Form 6-K
or Form 8-K to disclose the costs and other consequences of material cyber
incidents. See Item 5(a) of Form F-3 and Item 11(a) of Form S-3.
3

Securities Act Rule 408, Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, and Exchange Act Rule 14a-

9. Information is considered material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would consider it important in making an investment decision or if the
information would significantly alter the total mix of information made available. See
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); and TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976). Registrants also should consider the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, which apply to statements and omissions both inside and outside
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of Commission filings. See Securities Act Section 17(a); Exchange Act Section 10(b); and
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.
4

See Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K; and Form 20-F, Item 3.D.

5

Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K instructs registrants to “not present risks that

could apply to any issuer or any offering” and further, to “[e]xplain how the risk affects
the issuer or the securities being offered.” Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K.
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APPENDIX F: SEC ANTICDOTAL DATA
Google
In January 2010, Google made news when it disclosed that hackers based in China had
raided the company‘s networks.222 It reported that breach to the SEC in a ―Current Report‖
(Form 8-K) filed in January 2010, well before CF DG 2 was issued.223 The Annual Report the
company issued in January 2012 made only tentative statements about cybersecurity,
referencing (as had the other companies here reviewed) what would happen ―[i]f our security
measures are breached.‖224 The SEC invoked CF DG 2 when asking Google to revise its
disclosure to reference the 2010 attack ―to provide the proper context for your risk factor
disclosures.‖225 Google agreed, and in its subsequent disclosures, it noted that it
―experience[s] cyber-attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis, and . . . unauthorized
parties have obtained, and may in the future obtain, access to our data . . . [possibly resulting
in] an adverse effect on our business.‖226
Foot Notes:
222See Andrew Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google May End Venture in China Over Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at
A1. For general information on Google, the Internet services behemoth, see generally Google Inc. (GOOG.O) Company
Profile, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=GOOG.O (last visited Mar. 7, 2014)
(describing, among other things, the company‘s products and services).
223Google Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2, ex. 99.1 (Jan. 13, 2010).
224Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 15 (Jan. 26, 2012).
225Letter from Maryse Mills-Apenteng, Special Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, to Larry Page, Chief Exec. Officer, Google,
Inc. (May 2, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000000000012022687/filename1.pdf.
226Google, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 54–55 (July 24, 2012).
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Amazon.com
A leader in Internet retail, Amazon.com has a market capitalization of about $170
billion, 117,000 employees, and 2012 revenues of over $60 billion.178 The online shoe portal
Zappos.com—dubbed a ―shoe utopia‖ by the press179—is a subsidiary of Amazon‘s.
Recently, there was trouble in paradise: in January 2012, an unknown perpetrator infiltrated
Zappos‘ internal computer network through servers housed in Shepherdsville, Kentucky and
may have had ―illegal and unauthorized access‖ to customer account information, including
customers‘ names, e-mail addresses, billing and shipping addresses, phone numbers, the last
four digits of their credit card numbers, and their ―cryptographically scrambled
password[s].‖180 The episode garnered significant press and spurred class action suits for a
litany of civil wrongs.181
A few weeks later, Amazon filed its standard Annual Report (Form 10-K) with the
SEC. It made only vague references to the potential of cyber intrusions that ―could expose us
or our customers to a risk of loss or misuse of [personal] information, adversely affect our
operating results, result in litigation or potential liability for us and otherwise harm our
business.‖182 The report made no mention of the intrusion that had just occurred and triggered
lawsuits.
The SEC replied to Amazon‘s Annual Report and cited the recent news that, far from
a mere hypothetical intrusion, a cyber-attack on its Zappos subsidiary had ―occurred during
which millions of user accounts were compromised‖; accordingly, it asked the company to
―please address whether disclosure‖ in its 10-K of such an attack was necessary to advise
possible investors of all potential harm to its business, including ―reputational damage
affecting customer or investor confidence.‖183 To support its request for greater disclosure, the
SEC cited CF DG 2.184
At first Amazon protested, claiming that ―information on the specific incident would
not provide investors with additional material information relating to the cyber-attack risks
facing our business,‖ that the attack had no material impact on Amazon, and that any impact
on Zappos would be ―transitory.‖185 Undeterred, the SEC again pressed Amazon to
―expand‖ its 10-K ―to disclose that you have experienced cyber-attacks and breaches‖ in a
second letter the following month.186 This time, Amazon obliged. It wrote in its next filing that
some of its subsidiaries ―had past security breaches, and, although they did not have a
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material adverse effect on our operating results, there can be no assurance of a similar result
in the future.‖187 It is unclear what effect, if any, Amazon‘s subtle word change had on
shareholders‘ investment decisions.
Foot Notes:
178Amazon.com, Inc. Company Profile, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/quote/profile/profile.html?symb=AMZN (last
visited Mar. 6, 2014).
179Alexandra Jacobs, Happy Feet, NEW YORKER, SEPT. 14, 2009, at 66.
180Tony Hsieh, Security Email, ZAPPOS.COM (Jan. 15, 2012), http://blogs.zappos.com/securityemail (explaining
cyberattack and company‘s immediate remediation measures to employees, including the email subsequently sent to
customers).
181See David Goldman, Zappos Hacked, 24 Million Accounts Accessed, CNNMONEY (Jan. 16, 2012, 11:33 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/16/technology/zappos_hack/index.htm; Complaint at 1–2, 10–14, Stevens v. Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00032 M (W.D. Ky. Jan. 16, 2012). In June 2012, a multi-district panel consolidated the Stevens case with
similar litigation in the District of Nevada, where Zappos.com is headquartered. Transfer Order at 1357–59, In re
Zappos.Com, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (June 13, 2012), MDL No. 2357.
182Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Feb. 1, 2012) (emphasis added).
183Letter from William H. Thompson, Accounting Branch Chief, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, to Shelly Reynolds, Vice President
and Worldwide Controller, Amazon.com, Inc. (Mar. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000000000012012577/filename1.pdf.
184Id. (―Please tell us what consideration you gave to including expanded disclosure consistent with the guidance
provided by the Division of Corporation Finance‘s Disclosure Guidance Topic No. 2.‖).
185Letter from Shelly Reynolds, Vice President and Worldwide Controller, Amazon.com, Inc., to William H. Thompson,
Accounting Branch Chief, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n (Apr. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000119312512155627/filename1.htm.
186Letter from William H. Thompson, Accounting Branch Chief, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, to Shelly Reynolds, Vice President
and Worldwide Controller, Amazon.com, Inc. (Apr. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000000000012019757/filename1.pdf.
187Amazon.com, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 34 (July 27, 2012).
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APPENDIX G: SEC REGULATION S-K 229.503 (C)
229.503 (Item 503) Prospectus
summary,
risk factors, and ratio of
earnings to fixed charges.
The registrant must furnish this
information
in plain English. See
§ 230.421(d) of Regulation C of this
chapter.
(a) Prospectus summary. Provide a
summary of the information in the
prospectus
where the length or complexity
of the prospectus makes a summary
useful. The summary should be brief.
The summary should not contain, and
is not required to contain, all of the
detailed
information in the prospectus. If
you provide summary business or
financial
information, even if you do not
caption it as a summary, you still
must provide that information in plain
English.
Instruction to paragraph 503(a): The
summary
should not merely repeat the text of the
prospectus
but should provide a brief overview
of the key aspects of the offering.
Carefully
consider and identify those aspects of
the offering
that are the most significant and
determine
how best to highlight those points
in clear, plain language.
(b) Address and telephone number.
Include,
either on the cover page or in
the summary section of the prospectus,

the complete mailing address and
telephone
number of your principal executive
offices.
(c) Risk factors. Where appropriate,
provide under the caption ‘‘Risk
Factors’’
a discussion of the most significant
factors that make the offering
speculative or risky. This discussion
must be concise and organized logically.
Do not present risks that could
apply to any issuer or any offering.
Explain
how the risk affects the issuer or
the securities being offered. Set forth
each risk factor under a subcaption
that adequately describes the risk. The
risk factor discussion must immediately
follow the summary section. If
you do not include a summary section,
the risk factor section must immediately
follow the cover page of the
prospectus or the pricing information
section that immediately follows the
cover page. Pricing information means
price and price-related information
that you may omit from the prospectus
in an effective registration statement
based on § 230.430A(a) of this chapter.
The risk factors may include, among
other things, the following:
(1) Your lack of an operating history;
(2) Your lack of profitable operations
in recent periods;
(3) Your financial position;
(4) Your business or proposed business;
or
DSK5CLS3C1PROD with CFR
444
§ 229.504 17 CFR Ch. II (4–1–10 Edition)
(5) The lack of a market for your

2
common equity securities or securities
convertible into or exercisable for
common
equity securities.
(d) Ratio of earnings to fixed charges. If
you register debt securities, show a
ratio of earnings to fixed charges. If
you register preference equity
securities,
show the ratio of combined fixed
charges and preference dividends to
earnings. Present the ratio for each of
the last five fiscal years and the latest
interim period for which financial
statements are presented in the
document.
If you will use the proceeds from
the sale of debt or preference securities
to repay any of your outstanding debt
or to retire other securities and the
change in the ratio would be ten percent
or greater, you must include a
ratio showing the application of the
proceeds, commonly referred to as the
pro forma ratio.
Instructions to paragraph 503(d): 1.
Definitions.
In calculating the ratio of earnings to
fixed
charges, you must use the following
definitions:
(A) Fixed charges. The term ‘‘fixed
charges’’
means the sum of the following: (a)
interest
expensed and capitalized, (b) amortized
premiums,
discounts and capitalized expenses
related to indebtedness, (c) an estimate
of
the interest within rental expense, and
(d)
preference security dividend
requirements of
consolidated subsidiaries.

(B) Preference security dividend. The
term
‘‘preference security dividend’’ is the
amount
of pre-tax earnings that is required to
pay
the dividends on outstanding preference
securities.
The dividend requirement must be
computed as the amount of the dividend
divided
by (1 minus the effective income tax
rate applicable to continuing
operations).
(C) Earnings. The term ‘‘earnings’’ is the
amount resulting from adding and
subtracting
the following items. Add the following:
(a) pre-tax income from continuing
operations before adjustment for
income or
loss from equity investees; (b) fixed
charges;
(c) amortization of capitalized interest;
(d)
distributed income of equity investees;
and
(e) your share of pre-tax losses of equity
investees for which charges arising from
guarantees are included in fixed charges.
From the total of the added items,
subtract
the following: (a) interest capitalized;
(b)
preference security dividend
requirements of
consolidated subsidiaries; and (c) the
noncontrolling
interest in pre-tax income of
subsidiaries
that have not incurred fixed
charges. Equity investees are
investments
that you account for using the equity
method
of accounting. Public utilities following

3
SFAS 71 should not add amortization of
capitalized
interest in determining earnings, nor
reduce fixed charges by any allowance
for
funds used during construction.
2. Disclosure. Disclose the following
information
when showing the ratio of earnings
to fixed charges:
(A) Deficiency. If a ratio indicates less
than
one-to-one coverage, disclose the dollar
amount of the deficiency.
(B) Pro forma ratio. You may show the
pro
forma ratio only for the most recent
fiscal
year and the latest interim period. Use
the
net change in interest or dividends from
the
refinancing to calculate the pro forma
ratio.
(C) Foreign private issuers. A foreign
private
issuer must show the ratio based on the
figures
in the primary financial statement. A
foreign private issuer must show the
ratio

based on the figures resulting from the
reconciliation
to U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles if this ratio is materially
different.
(D) Summary Section. If you provide a
summary
or similar section in the prospectus,
show the ratios in that section.
3. Exhibit. File an exhibit to the
registration
statement to show the figures used to
calculate the ratios. See paragraph
(b)(12) of
Item 601 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR
229.601(b)(12)).
(e) Smaller reporting companies. A
registrant
that qualifies as a smaller reporting
company, as defined by
§ 229.10(f), need not comply with
paragraph
(d) of this Item.
Instruction to Item 503: For asset-backed
securities,
see also Item 1103 of Regulation AB
(§ 229.1103).
[63 FR 6383, Feb. 6, 1998, as amended
at 70 FR
1594, Jan. 7, 2005; 73 FR 964, Jan. 4,
2008; 74 FR
18617, Apr. 23, 2009]

